











cost-containment	 and	 fair-pricing	 efforts.	 	 State-level	 reform,	 however,	




best	 understood	 as	 being	 charged	 with	 sufficiently	 incentivizing	
innovation.		Thus,	excessively	rewarding	patent	holders	is	not	among	its	
aims.	 	 From	 this	 premise,	 I	 advance	 three	 main	 arguments.	 	 First,	
excessively	 priced	 patented	 medications	 are	 at	 odds	 with	 the	 public	
purposes	of	 the	patent	 system.	 	They	are	 further	unfair	 to	patients	and	
health	 systems	 against	 the	 background	 of	 their	 widespread	
unaffordability.		For	these	reasons,	drug	price	regulation	is	warranted.			
Second,	the	federal	government	should	be	the	one	to	comprehensively	
address	 the	 problem	 of	 excessively	 priced	 patented	 medications,	 but	
congressional	action	has	been	politically	stalled	and	uncertain.		State-level	
interventions	 offer	 the	 possibility	 of	 second-best	 solutions.	 	 Yet,	 though	
states	are	 the	 locus	of	 drug	pricing	 reform,	 their	 degrees	 of	 regulatory	
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freedom	 are	 constrained	 by	 misguided	 Federal	 Circuit	 precedent.		
Consequently,	federal	regulatory	failure	is	compounded	by	neutered	state	
regulation.		
Third,	 states	 should	 not	 be	 preempted	 by	 federal	 patent	 law	 from	
addressing	the	urgent	problem	of	excessively	priced	patented	medications.		
Their	exclusion	is	neither	doctrinally	required	nor	desirable	public	policy.		
Unfettered	by	patent	preemption,	 state	 regulation	holds	 the	promise	of	
improving	 physical	 and	 fiscal	 health	 as	 well	 as	 manifesting	 an	
overwhelming	bipartisan	preference	for	drug	pricing	reform.		












































































Expensive	 prescription	 drugs	 are	 imposing	 seemingly	 needless	





patented	 medications	 comprise	 the	 bulk	 of	 prescription	 spending	
despite	 being	 a	minority	 of	 prescriptions.4	 	 In	 2019,	 for	 instance,	 80	







national	 policy	 solution	 is	 preferable	 morally	 and	 doctrinally.	 	 Yet,	
despite	 federal	 bipartisan	 support	 for	 drug	 pricing	 reform,	 to	 date,	
Congress	and	the	executive	branch	have	 largely	 failed	to	act.	 	Federal	
drug	 pricing	 reform	 remains	 underpowered	 and	 uncertain,	 and	with	
multiple	 crises	 spanning	 political	 insurrection,	 climate	 change,	





drugs.org/our-stories/	 (last	 visited	 Sept.	 23,	 2021)	 (collecting	 patient	 narratives	
describing	the	impact	of	expensive	medications).	











tical-spending-us	 (finding	 that	 single-source	 patented	 drugs	 make	 up	 less	 than	 10		
percent	of	filled	prescriptions,	but	a	staggering	63	percent	of	drug	spending).	









address	 the	 problem	 of	 excessively	 priced	 medications.	 	 Further,	 in	
contrast	 to	 the	 federal	 government,	 states	 have	 the	 demonstrated	
political	ability	to	enact	a	variety	of	drug	pricing	reforms.		
States	 have	 a	 particular	 interest	 in	 the	 pricing	 of	 patented	
medications.		High	prescription	drug	prices	impose	great	personal	costs	
on	 constituents	 and	 systemic	 costs	 on	 state	 budgets.7	 	 In	 2016,	 for	
instance,	 Louisiana	 was	 grappling	 with	 how	 to	 pay	 for	 Hepatitis	 C	
medications.8		The	state	would	need	to	spend	an	estimated	$760	million	
to	 treat	 all	 infected	Medicaid	 enrollees	 and	 its	 uninsured,	which	was	
more	 than	 Louisiana’s	 expenditures	 on	 “K-12	 education,	 Veteran’s	
Affairs,	 and	 Corrections	 combined.”9	 	 Paying	 for	 these	 medications	
would	 mean	 defunding	 other	 important	 programs.10	 	 More	 recently,	
given	 its	 low	clinical	 value,	high	price,	 and	potentially	 sizable	patient	
population,	 the	 FDA’s	 controversial	 accelerated	 approval	 of	 Aduhelm	
(an	Alzheimer’s	drug)	is	raising	significant	concerns	about	its	costs	for	
Medicaid	programs.11		Outside	of	Medicaid,	states	experience	significant	
drug	 spending	 through	 correctional	 facilities	 as	 well	 as	 through	
employee	 and	 retiree	 health	 benefits.12	 	 State	 legislators,	 further,	
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poses-tapping-a-federal-law-to-slash-hepatitis-c-drug-prices/;	 Louisiana	 Budget	 Allo-
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State-level	 reform,	 however,	 confronts	 the	 headwinds	 of	 patent	
preemption.		As	patent	rights	are	federally	conferred,	how—if	at	all—
may	states	regulate	excessively	priced	patented	medications?		
This	Article	 analyzes	 state	 excessive	drug	pricing	 reforms	at	 the	
intersection	of	federal	patent	law.	 	It	advances	three	main	arguments.		
First,	 excessively	 priced	 patented	 medications	 are	 at	 odds	 with	 the	
public	purposes	of	the	patent	system.		Further,	against	a	background	of	
their	 widespread	 unaffordability,	 excessively	 priced	 patented	
medications	 are	 unfair	 to	 patients	 and	 health	 systems.	 	 For	 these	
reasons,	drug	price	regulation	is	warranted.	
Second,	 the	 federal	 government	 should	 address	 the	 problem	 of	
excessively	 priced	 patented	 medications,	 but	 congressional	 action	
continues	 to	 face	 significant	 political	 challenges.	 	 State-level	
interventions	therefore	offer	the	possibility	of	second-best	solutions.19		
Although	states	are	 the	 locus	of	drug	pricing	reform,	 their	degrees	of	




patent	 law	 from	addressing	 the	urgent	problem	of	 excessively	priced	
patented	medications.	 	Their	exclusion	 is	neither	doctrinally	required	
nor	 desirable	 public	 policy.	 	 Unfettered	 by	 patent	 preemption,	 state	
regulation	holds	the	promise	of	improving	physical	and	fiscal	health	as	
well	 as	manifesting	 an	 overwhelming	 bipartisan	 preference	 for	 drug	
pricing	reform.		
States	 further	 have	 valuable	 contributions	 to	 make	 to	 federal	
biopharmaceutical	innovation	policy.		States	have	an	underappreciated	
role	 to	 play	 in	 recalibrating	 federal	 patent	 policy	 away	 from	 the	
privileging	of	private	interests	and	aligning	it	with	its	intended	public-
serving	 purpose.	 	 They	 have	 important	 contributions	 to	 make	 to	
national	 conversations	 about	 innovation	 incentives	 and	 fair	 drug	
pricing.	 	Under	present	circumstances,	 to	 the	extent	states	are	patent	
preempted	 from	 regulation	 reaching	 patented	 drug	 prices,	 this	 is	 a	
significant	 and	 unwarranted	 missed	 opportunity	 both	 to	 meet	 the	
urgent	needs	of	Americans	and	to	pursue	the	best	version	of	our	federal	
pharmaceutical	innovation	policy.	
This	 Article	 proceeds	 in	 three	 parts.	 	 Part	 II	 establishes	 the	
underlying	 public	 purpose	 of	 federal	 patent	 law.	 	 It	 begins	 from	 the	
 
	 19	 The	phrase	“second-best”	is	not	intended	to	confer	a	meaning	of	“not	very	good.”		









federal	 patent	 policy.	 	 I	 argue	 that	 excessiveness	 can	 be	 defined	 by	
reference	to	the	goals	of	federal	patent	law	itself,	suggesting	a	model	of	
cost-plus	pricing.	 	As	such,	excessive	pricing	 is	not	 identical	to	supra-
competitive	 pricing.	 	 Overcompensation	 of	 patent	 holders	 is	
unwarranted	by	reference	to	the	aims	of	federal	patent	law	and	morally	
problematic	when	 such	overcompensation	 further	 renders	 important	
medications	 unaffordable.	 	 I	 make	 a	 prima	 facie	 case	 that	
overcompensation	 of	 drug	 manufacturers	 occurs	 and	 conclude	 that	






preference	 for	 price	 regulation	 over	 payment	 regulation.	 	 This	 Part	
further	 discusses	 state	 experimentation	 with	 excessive	 price	 and	
payment	 legislation.	 	 It	 then	 turns	 to	 the	 doctrinal	 issue	 of	 patent	
preemption.		It	analyzes	the	practical	barrier	to	state	regulation	posed	





precedent.	 	 This	 Part	 considers	 five	 options	 available	 to	 states:	 (1)	
congressional	 amendment;	 (2)	 the	 shield	 of	 sovereign	 immunity;	 (3)	
reformulated	excessive	price	regulations;	(4)	tax	penalties	on	excessive	
price	increases;	and	(5)	payment	regulation.	 	It	ultimately	argues	that	
payment	 regulation,	 at	 this	 time,	 is	 likely	 the	 least	 risky	 and	 most	
expedient	comprehensive	option	for	state-level	drug	pricing	reform	that	
avoids	 patent	 preemption.	 	 This	 Part	 concludes	 by	 considering	 the	










Two	 caveats	 to	 this	 article’s	 arguments	 and	 discussions	 are	 in	
order.	 	First,	this	discussion	focuses	exclusively	on	the	issue	of	patent	
preemption.	 	 This	 focus	 does	 not	 mean	 that	 other	 issues	 are	
unimportant	 or	 even	 non-dispositive.	 	 For	 instance,	 in	 addition	 to	
surviving	patent	preemption,	state-level	price	or	payment	regulations	




Second,	 this	 Article	 primarily	 contemplates	 state	 reform	 efforts	
outside	 the	 context	 of	 Medicaid.	 	 Yet,	 there	 is	 considerable	 change	
occurring	within	state	Medicaid	programs	with	regard	to	prescription	
drug	 payment.	 	 Many	 states	 are	 experimenting	 with	 value-based	
contracting	or	cost	review	to	secure	supplemental	rebates.24	 	As	state	






pharmaceutical	 patent	 policy	 is	 also	 inherently	 valuable	 in	 its	
expression	 of	 traditional	 values	 of	 federalism,	 such	 as	 local	




constituents	 have	 reasonably	 affordable	 access	 to	 one	 of	 life’s	
necessities.	 	 The	 federal	 government	 qua	 federal	 government	 is	 far	
















that	 supports	 the	 moral	 desirability	 of	 targeted	 price	 regulation.26		
Targeted	government	regulation	of	excessively	high	prescription	drug	






be	challenging	 to	define	 the	precise	parameters	of	what	 is	or	 is	not	a	
necessity,	necessary	goods	encompass—at	the	very	least—those	items	




their	 access	 and	 affordability	 in	 a	 way	 that	 we	 do	 not	 regarding	
luxuries.29		As	necessary	goods,	unaffordable	prescription	medications	
can	 seem	unfair.30	 	 Their	 unaffordability	 appears	 to	 serve	 as	 a	moral	
inflection	point.31		It	might	be	thought	of	as	a	proxy	for	the	imposition	of	
sacrifices	 that	 appear	 deeply	 unfair:	 the	 compelled	 sacrifice	 of	 other	




Mello	&	Rebecca	E.	Wolitz,	Legal	Strategies	 for	Reining	 in	 “Unconscionable”	Prices	 for	
Prescription	 Drugs,	 114	 NW.	 U.	 L.	 REV.	 859,	 863–64	 (2020)	 (putting	 forward	 five	
commonsense	assumptions	regarding	a	workable	excessive	drug	price	regulation).	
	 27	 Cf.	Ezekiel	J.	Emanuel,	When	Is	the	Price	of	a	Drug	Unjust?		The	Average	Lifetime	
Earnings	 Standard,	 38	HEALTH	AFFS.	 604,	 604	 (2019)	 (arguing	 that	many	 health	 care	
goods	are	“necessary	to	live	a	decent	human	life”).	
	 28	 See,	e.g.,	 id.;	see	also	Richard	A.	Spinello,	Ethics,	Pricing	and	the	Pharmaceutical	

















a	 tradeoff	 she	 ought	 not	 have	 to	make.	 	 This	 idea	 has	 parallels	with	
institutions.		A	state,	for	instance,	should	not	have	to	decide	whether	to	
cover	 a	 single,	 yet	 important,	 medication	 or	 defund	 educational	
programs	or	social	services	for	vulnerable	children.34	
As	the	unaffordability	of	prescription	medications	can	have	many	




a	medication	 already	 appears	 excessive	 by	 reference	 to	 independent	
criteria.	 	 As	 argued	 in	 more	 detail	 below,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 patented	
medications,	 the	 goals	 of	 the	 federal	 patent	 system	 can	 provide	 this	
criterion:	patent	rewards	that	exceed	those	necessary	to	effectuate	the	
goals	 of	 federal	patent	 law	are	 excessive	 and	overcompensate	patent	
holders.		
Thus,	when	 affordability	 challenges	 are	 overlaid	 upon	 excessive	
patented	drug	pricing,	 additional	 justifications	 for	 regulation	become	















	 33	 Michael	Sainato,	 ‘Medication	or	Housing’:	Why	Soaring	 Insulin	Prices	Are	Killing	
Americans,	 GUARDIAN	 (Sept.	 23,	 2019,	 2:00	 AM),	 https://www.theguardian.com/
society/2019/sep/23/diabetes-americans-soaring-insulin-prices;	 Jo	 Ann	 Jenkins,	











would	 regulation	 be	 justified	 as	 a	 countermeasure	 to	 inefficiency	 by	







it	 is	 unjustified	 for	 the	 government	 to	 permit,	 through	 a	 lack	 of	





Regulation	down	to	 the	non-excessive	price	 is	 justified	on	grounds	of	
efficiency,	and	in	some	cases,	unfairness	as	well.37		
Whether	 government	 regulation	 in	 cases	 of	 excessively	 priced	
patented	medications	 is	 justified	on	grounds	of	 efficiency	or	 fairness,	
however,	two	showings	must	be	made.		First,	it	must	be	demonstrated	
that	overcompensation	of	patent	holders	is	not	among	the	purposes	of	




will	 flounder.	 	Second,	 to	 justify	governmental	 intervention,	at	 least	a	








provided	 through	 patent	 rewards,	 it	 would	 appear	 unfair	 to	 price	 in	 excess	 of	 the	
“sufficient”	price.	 	Wolitz,	Drug	Manufacturers,	Pricing,	 and	Ethical	Obligations,	 supra	
note	26,	at	171,	191	(making	a	similar	argument).		A	further	wrinkle	is	how	we	ought	to	
think	about	regulation	of	 the	surplus	between	the	“sufficient”	price	(that	 is,	 the	non-
excessive	price	of	a	patented	drug)	and	the	affordable	price,	when	the	affordable	price	
exceeds	 the	 sufficient	 price.	 	 Unless	 the	 affordable	 price	 is	 also	 the	 non-excessive	
patented	 price,	 this	 leaves	 a	 gap	 between	 the	 non-excessive	 patented	 price	 and	 the	
affordable	price.		It	is	tempting	to	think	that	any	price	above	the	sufficient	price	is	unfair.		












the	 federal	 government	 in	 exchange	 for	 the	 public	 disclosure	 of	 an	
invention.	 	Congressional	 authority	 to	grant	patents	derives	 from	 the	
Intellectual	 Property	 Clause	 of	 the	 United	 States	 Constitution.	 	 This	
Clause	 provides:	 “The	Congress	 shall	 have	Power	 .	.	.	 To	 promote	 the	
Progress	 of	 Science	 and	useful	Arts,	 by	 securing	 for	 limited	Times	 to	
Authors	and	Inventors	the	exclusive	Right	to	their	respective	Writings	
and	Discoveries.”38		Congress	created	a	statutory	scheme	implementing	
this	 Constitutional	 power.	 	 By	 statute,	 patent	 holders	 may	 exclude	
“whoever	 without	 authority	 makes,	 uses,	 offers	 to	 sell,	 or	 sells	 any	
patented	invention	.	.	.	.”39		
Despite	being	rights	of	exclusion,	patent	rights	are	often	confused	
with	 rights	 to	 an	 economic	 monopoly.40	 	 Yet,	 patent	 rights	 are	 not	
monopoly	 rights.41	 	The	difference	 is	 subtle,	but	 its	 implications	vast.		
Patents	can,	and	do,	enable	monopolies	when	market	conditions	permit,	
but	 the	 rights	 themselves	 are	 not	 rights	 to	 an	 economic	 monopoly.		
Rights	to	an	economic	monopoly	suggest	affirmative	rights	to	occupy	a	
marketplace	 and	 further	 the	 absence	of	 competition.42	 	 But	 “a	patent	
does	not	grant	the	right	to	make,	use,	and	sell	the	invention.”43		A	patent	













competition	 from	 “the	 same	 drug	 for	 the	 same	 disease	 or	 condition”	 by	 preventing	
approval	during	 the	exclusivity	period.	 	 21	U.S.C.	 §	360cc(a).	 	By	 contrast,	with	data	
exclusivity,	generic	competitors	are	precluded	from	seeking	FDA	approval	during	the	
data	exclusivity	term	if	they	rely	on	the	originator’s	data.	 	See,	e.g.,	Erika	Lietzan,	The	





others	 from	 undertaking	 activities	 that	 fall	 within	 the	 scope	 of	 a	
patent.44		
Consequently,	 patents	 do	 not	 guarantee	 their	 holders	 any	
particular	 economic	benefits,	 let	 alone	any	economic	benefits	 at	 all.45		
For	 instance,	 there	may	 be	 no	market	 for	 a	 patented	 product.46	 	 Or,	
despite	 the	 existence	 of	 patents,	 the	market	might	 be	 competitive	 in	
light	of	non-infringing	products.47		In	the	prescription	drug	context,	the	
recent	 competition	 between	 hepatitis	 C	 treatments	 illustrates	 this	
point.48		Though	Gilead	Sciences	was	first	to	market,	AbbVie	eventually	
offered	a	competing	treatment.49		
Nevertheless,	 particularly	 in	 the	 absence	 of	 non-infringing	
competition,50	 patents	 create	 opportunities	 for	 monopoly	 pricing.51		
Monopoly	pricing	comes	at	a	predictable	cost:	“some	people	who	would	
be	willing	to	pay	more	than	the	marginal	cost	of	a	copy	of	the	idea	will	
not	 be	 able	 to	 access	 it.”52	 	 When	 the	 patented	 goods	 involved	 are	









COMPUT.	&	TECH.	L.J.	40,	45	 (2019);	 Joshua	D.	 Sarnoff,	 BIO	 v.	DC	 and	 the	New	Need	 to	
Eliminate	 Federal	 Patent	 Law	 Preemption	 of	 State	 and	 Local	 Price	 and	 Product	
Regulation,	2007	PATENTLY-O	PAT.	L.J.	30,	33–34	(2007).	
	 46	 See	 Frederick	M.	Abbott,	Excessive	Pharmaceutical	Prices	and	Competition	Law:	







	 50	 Even	 with	 competition	 between	 patented	 medications,	 downward	 pricing	
pressure	is	often	modest.		Id.;	Jonathan	J.	Darrow	&	Aaron	S.	Kesselheim,	Policy	Options	













decision	 to	 charge	 what	 the	 market	 will	 bear	 can	 literally	 be	 the	
difference	between	 life	 and	death.54	 	 At	 the	 state	 level,	 it	 can	 compel	
officials	to	confront	a	tragic	set	of	choices:	does	one	defund	education	
and	infrastructure	or	restrict	access	to	a	life-saving	treatment?55		
These	 tragic	 choices	 imposed	 on	 individuals	 and	 states	 by	 the	
existing	federal	statutory	scheme	raise	significant	questions	about	the	
purpose	of	this	regime	in	the	first	instance.		One	could	be	forgiven	for	
thinking	 that	 patents	 are	merely	 tools	 for	 promoting	 private	wealth.		
Consider,	 as	 but	 one	 example,	 the	 “best-selling	 drug”	 in	 the	 United	








times	 over	with	 plenty	 leftover	 for	 billions	 of	 dollars	 in	 profits.”60	 	 A	
recent	 congressional	 investigation	 of	Humira	 estimates	 that	AbbVie’s	





	 54	 See,	 e.g.,	 Shraddha	 Chakradhar,	 ‘Maisie’s	 Army’:	 How	 a	 Grassroots	 Group	 Is	




Running	 out	 of	 Time,	 BUS.	 INSIDER	 (July	26,	 2019),	 https://www.businessinsider.com/
health-insurance-companies-deny-kids-with-sma-gene-therapy-zolgensma-2019-7.	
	 55	 See,	e.g.,	LOUISIANA	BUDGET	ALLOCATOR,	supra	note	10.	
















the	 purpose	 of	 patent	 law.62	 	 Rather,	 federal	 patent	 law’s	 purpose	 is	




precedent,	 and	 academic	 consensus.	 	 The	 purpose	 of	 the	 Intellectual	
Property	Clause	“on	its	face	.	.	.	is	to	promote	the	public	interest	through	
an	increase	of	the	public	domain	or	commons	of	intellectual	ideas	and	
thought.”66	 	 Likewise,	 the	Supreme	Court	 stated	 that	 the	 “limited	and	
temporary	monopoly	granted	to	inventors	was	never	designed	for	their	
exclusive	profit	or	advantage;	the	benefit	to	the	public	or	community	at	
large	was	 another	 and	 doubtless	 the	 primary	 object	 in	 granting	 and	
securing	that	monopoly.”67		Patents	by	their	“very	nature”	are	“affected	
with	 a	 public	 interest”	 and	 “a	 special	 privilege	 designed	 to	 serve	 the	
public	purpose	of	promoting	the	‘Progress	of	Science	and	useful	Arts.’”68		
The	 Court	 more	 specifically	 articulated	 that	 federal	 patent	 law	
serves	 three	 objectives:	 (1)	 to	 foster	 and	 reward	 innovation,	 (2)	 to	
promote	the	disclosure	of	inventions	to	stimulate	further	creation,	and	
(3)	to	assure	that	innovations	in	the	public	domain	stay	there.69		Each	of	





















copyright	 case,	 but	 discusses	 the	 constitutional	 clause	 and	 refers	 to	 “authors	 and		
inventors.”		Id.	at	429–30.	
	 68	 Precision	 Instrument	Mfg.	 Co.	 v.	 Auto.	Maint.	Mach.	 Co.,	 324	U.S.	 806,	 815–16	
(1945);	 see	also	Blonder-Tongue	Lab’ys,	 Inc.	v.	Univ.	of	 Ill.	 Found.,	402	U.S.	313,	344	






system	 is,	 by	 far,	 the	 “predominant”	 justification	 among	
commentators.70		The	“embarrassment”71	of	a	patent—that	is,	the	social	
costs	 imposed	 upon	 the	 public	 by	 rights	 of	 exclusion—is	 primarily	
justified	 by	 reference	 to	 an	 incentive	 theory	 of	 patent	 law.72	 	 Patent	
rights	 purportedly	 play	 a	 necessary	 role	 in	 bringing	 forth	 new	
knowledge	goods,	ultimately	placed	in	the	public	domain,	that	might	not	
have	existed	in	their	absence.73		This	role	is	the	logic	of	having	patented	
prescription	 medications.	 	 Patent	 policy	 “tolerates”	 the	 allocative	
inefficiencies	of	patients	being	priced	out	of	 their	medications	on	 the	
assumption	that	“[t]he	prospect	of	monopoly	profits”	offered	by	patent	
protection	 is	necessary	 to	“create	[a]	drug	 in	 the	 first	place.	 	 In	other	
words,	the	development	of	the	drug	is	necessary	to	provide	any	access	
at	all.”74	
Why	emphasize	 the	public	purpose	of	 federal	patent	 law?	 	 If	 the	
private	reward	of	patent	holders	as	an	end	in	and	of	itself	is	not	among	
the	purposes	of	 federal	patent	 law,	 claims	 that	 the	potential	 rewards	
offered	by	patent	protection	are	untouchable—that	they	must	be	wholly	
unlimited	 and	 unregulated—are	 weakened.	 	 Regulation	 of	 potential	
patent	 rewards,	 consistent	 with	 the	 public	 objectives	 of	 the	 patent	





undermine	 the	 ability	 of	 patents	 to	 incentivize	 innovation?	 	 In	 the	
pharmaceutical	context—where	the	industry	is	both	largely	privatized	
and	financed	through	patent	rents—this	could	negatively	 impact	new	
drug	discovery.75	 	Claims	 that	 lower	prices	 today	will	 inevitably	yield	
 
	 70	 Carrier,	 supra	 note	 51,	 at	 31–32	 (“The	 utilitarian	 justification	 of	 providing	
incentives	 to	 innovate,	 however,	 is	 the	 predominant	 justification	 for	 IP,	 one	 that	 is	
consistent	with	the	Constitution,	that	the	courts	have	recognized,	and	that	the	academic	
literature	has	tested.”).	




	 74	 Mark	 A.	 Lemley,	 Lisa	 Larrimore	 Ouellette	 &	 Rachel	 E.	 Sachs,	 The	 Medicare		
Innovation	Subsidy,	95	N.Y.U.	L.	REV.	75,	108–09	(2020).	
	 75	 Id.	 at	 121	 (noting	 that	 the	 United	 States	 “alone	 among	 developed	 countries”		











Excessive	 compensation	of	patent	holders	 is	notably	 absent	 from	 the	
purposes	 of	 federal	 patent	 law,	 and	 consequently	 there	 is	 neither	 a	
constitutional	nor	congressional	mandate	to	compel	users	of	patented	
products	 to	overpay	 through	excessive	pricing.	 	To	 the	contrary,	 “the	
goal	of	 intellectual	property	 is	only	to	provide	the	 ‘optimal	 incentive,’	
not	 the	 largest	 incentive	 possible.”78	 	 The	 excessive	 compensation	 of	








the	 purposes	 of	 the	 patent	 system	 is	 highly	 suggestive	 of	 a	 cost-plus	
model	 of	 excessive	 drug	 pricing.80	 	 When	 drug	 pricing	 exceeds	 a	
manufacturer’s	 costs	 plus	 a	 reasonable	 profit,	 the	 price	 charged	 is	
excessive.81		The	aims	of	the	patent	system	help	define	what	constitutes	
 
861–62	 (stating	 that	 the	 industry	 is	 largely,	 but	 not	 exclusively	 privatized,	 and	 that		
interactions	between	public	and	private	financing	for	drugs	are	complex).	
	 76	 See,	 e.g.,	 Rebecca	 E.	 Wolitz,	 A	 Corporate	 Duty	 to	 Rescue:	 Biopharmaceutical	
Companies	 and	 Access	 to	Medications,	94	 IND.	L.	 J.	1163,	1212–13	 (2019);	Michael	 A.	
Carrier	&	Genevieve	Tung,	Opinion,	The	Industry	that	Cries	Wolf:	Pharma	and	Innovation,	






	 79	 Cf.	Daniel	 J.	Hemel	&	Lisa	Larrimore	Ouellette,	Bayh-Dole	Beyond	Borders,	4	 J.L.	
BIOSCIENCES	 1,	 2	 n.15	 (2017)	 (defining	 “‘excessive’	 rewards	 for	 knowledge-good	
producers”	 as	 occurring	when	 “the	 reward	 exceeds	 the	 amount	 needed	 to	 induce	 a	
potential	innovator	to	pursue	a	project”).	
	 80	 While	 some	 might	 subscribe	 to	 the	 view	 that	 cost-plus	 pricing	 serves	 as	 a	









is	 not	 identical	 to	 supra-competitive	 pricing.82	 	 Just	 because	 the	
necessary	incentives	require	supra-competitive	pricing	does	not	mean	
such	pricing	is	excessive.		The	concerns	motivating	justified	government	
intervention	 are	 not	 about	 patented	 medications	 simply	 being	
expensive	 or	 priced	 above	 what	 one	 might	 expect	 in	 a	 competitive	
market.	 	The	concerns	 that	motivate	and	 justify	 regulation	pertain	 to	
excessiveness	and	unfairness.	 	Excessive	patent	holder	 compensation	






affordability	 challenges	 also	 exist,	 price	 regulation	 can	 be	 morally	
justified	on	fairness	grounds.	
A	 cost-plus	 perspective	 on	 excessive	 patented	 prescription	 drug	
pricing	 furthermore,	 and	 incidentally,	 helps	 account	 for	 several	
dominant	themes	in	drug	pricing	debates.		With	respect	to	research	and	
development	 costs,	 it	 explains	 why	 the	 drug	 industry,	 at	 least	
historically,	 has	 perpetuated	 the	 often	 questionable	 (yet	 chronic)	
argument	that	high	prices	for	prescription	medications	are	necessary	to	





The	 cost-plus	 perspective	 further	 helps	 explain	 concerns	 about	
expensive	 medications	 in	 light	 of	 those	 drugs’	 public	 financing.85	 	 A	





























Broad	 generalizations	 about	 a	 varied	 and	 complex	 industry	 are	
imprudent.	 	 The	 pharmaceutical	 industry,	 despite	 the	 existence	 of	
patents,	has	clear	market	failures;	in	some	cases,	patents	on	their	own	
are	 insufficient	 to	 sustain	 or	 bring	 forth	 certain	 kinds	 of	 innovation.		
Therapies	for	neglected	diseases	or	those	predominantly	plaguing	low	
































and	 still	 be	 as	 or	 more	 lucrative	 than	 other	 industries.	 	 The	 study’s	
authors	 therefore	 found	 that	 even	 with	 lower	 ROIC,	 “manufacturers	
could	 still	 maintain	 a	 revenue	 level	 that	 is	 attractive	 to	 institutional	
investors	 without	 reducing	 current	 expenditures	 for	 research	 and	
development.”96		
Other	recent	studies	are	further	suggestive	of	the	prima	facie	case.		
Cancer	drugs,	 for	 instance,	are	routinely	priced	 in	excess	of	$100,000	
per	year	of	treatment.97	 	Yet	one	study	of	such	drugs	found	that	while	
the	median	 cost	 of	 development	was	 $648	million,	median	 revenues	
post-approval	 were	 $1658.4	 million	 with	 a	 range	 up	 to	 $22,275	
million.98	 	In	aggregate,	total	revenue	from	the	drugs	studied	was	$67	
billion	 compared	 with	 total	 research	 and	 development	 (“R&D”)	
spending	 of	 $7.2	 billion.99	 	 The	 authors	 concluded	 that	 development	
costs	were	“more	than	recouped”	over	a	short	period	of	time,	and	that	
some	companies	 saw	revenue	 in	excess	of	 ten	 times	 their	R&D	costs,	
representing	 “a	 sum	 not	 seen	 in	 other	 sectors	 of	 the	 economy.”100		
Another	 study	 of	 ninety-nine	 FDA-approved	 cancer	 drugs	 likewise	
found	that	every	$1	spent	on	R&D	generated	a	median	of	$14.50	in	sales	
income	(with	a	range	up	to	$55.10)	for	originator	companies.101		These	





Yet	 another	 analysis	 of	 the	 world’s	 twenty	 top-selling	 drugs	























worldwide	 research	 budgets	 are	 covered.”105	 	 An	 even	 more	 recent	
comparative	 country	 study	 found	 that	 U.S.	 prices	 for	 brand-name	
originator	drugs	are	344	percent	more	expensive	than	those	in	thirty-
two	 comparison	 Organisation	 for	 Economic	 Co-operation	 and	
Development	 countries.106	 	 There	 are	 other	 examples.107	 	 Further,	
regular	 price	 increases	 by	 name	 brand	 companies,	 far	 in	 excess	 of	












panies	 Do	 Not	 Explain	 Elevated	 US	 Drug	 Prices,	 HEALTH	 AFFS.	 BLOG	 (Mar.	 7,	 2017),	
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20170307.059036/full/.	
	 105	 Id.	
	 106	 Andrew	 E.	 Mulcahy	 et.	 al.,	 International	 Prescription	 Drug	 Price	 Comparisons:		
Current	Empirical	Estimates	and	Comparisons	with	Previous	Studies,	RAND	CORP.,	at	vii,	xii	
(2021),	https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2956.html.	


























allow	 injunctions.	 	 Again,	 however,	 in	 recent	 memory	 government	
patent	 use	 has	 remained	 largely	 dormant	 as	 a	 tool	 to	 improve	 drug	
accessibility.112	 	 The	 Drug	 Price	 Competition	 and	 Patent	 Term	
Restoration	 Act	 (“Hatch-Waxman	 Act”)113	 and	 the	 Biologics	 Price	




procurement	 (e.g.,	 Medicare,	 Medicaid,	 and	 the	 Federal	 Supply	
Schedule)	regulate,	to	some	extent,	the	price	of	medications,	including	
those	that	are	patented.		On	the	whole,	however,	with	limited	exceptions	
for	 regulation	 of	 certain	 price	 increases,115	 these	 laws	 are	 generally	
ineffective	at	counteracting	overall	trends,	and	none	currently	regulate	
patented	 medications	 for	 price	 excessiveness.	 	 Drug	 manufacturers	
 
	 110	 35	U.S.C.	 §	 202(c)(4)	 (providing	 the	 federal	 government	with	 a	 “nonexclusive,	














ment	 Patent	 Use	 as	 Versatile	 Policy	 Tool,	 WRITTEN	 DESCRIPTION	 (Apr.	 24,	 2020),	
https://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2020/04/whos-afraid-of-section-1498-gov-
ernment.html.	




	 115	 42	 U.S.C.	 §	 1396r-8(c)(2)(A)	 (Medicaid	 provision	 limiting	 price	 increases);	
Lemley,	Ouellette,	&	Sachs,	supra	note	74,	at	89	(noting	that	more	than	half	of	Medicaid	





interacting	 with	 these	 programs	 are	 still	 free	 to	 initially	 price	 their	
products	 as	 they	wish.	 	Moreover,	 given	 that	Medicare	 and	Medicaid	
must	 cover	 certain	 drugs	 as	 a	 matter	 of	 law,	 this	 weakens	 their	
bargaining	position.116	
The	Constitution	empowered	Congress	to	create	a	patent	scheme	








administration,	 just	 behind	 lowering	 health	 care	 costs	 more	
generally.118		
Yet,	patented	drug	prices	remain	largely	unregulated,	and	a	prima	
facie	 case	 can	be	made	 that	Americans	needlessly	pay	more	 for	 their	
medications	 than	 serves	 the	 existing	 ends	 of	 federal	 patent	 policy.		
While	 rights	 of	 exclusion	 under	 conditions	 of	 scarce	 resources	 could	
mean	a	tradeoff	of	access	by	present	patients	for	the	existence	of	new	
therapies	 for	 future	patients,	drugs	are	necessities.	 	Congress	and	the	
executive	 branch	 have	 thus	 far	 failed	 to	 execute	 laws	 that	 treat	 this	
potential	 tradeoff	 with	 the	 gravitas	 it	 deserves.	 	 They	 have	 further	
privileged	 private	 interests	 beyond	 the	 purposes	 imposed	 by	 the	




implemented	 meaningful	 reform.	 	 While	 Congress	 has	 again	 been	






















well-crafted	 solutions	 to	 problems	 of	 excessively	 priced	 patented	
medications	by	 the	 federal	government.	 	A	national	policy	 solution	 is	




unfairness,	 piecemeal	 regulation	 at	 the	 sub-national	 level	 runs	 the	
substantial	risk	of	leaving	many	behind.		Unfair	pricing	will	persist	for	
some	 and	 not	 others	 because	 of	 the	 arguably	 morally	 insignificant	
distinction	of	intranational	geographic	boundaries.		
Likewise,	 for	 regulation	 justified	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 correcting	 for	




more	 patients	will	 have	 access	 to	 important	medications.	 	 Lives	 and	
health	are	on	the	line.	
Doctrinally	 and	 pragmatically,	 a	 national	 solution	 would	 avoid	




grapple	with	 and	 litigate	 problems	 of	 patent	 preemption.	 	 They	 also	
have	to	contend	with	the	dormant	Commerce	Clause.		Federal	regulation	
sidesteps	these	potential	doctrinal	impediments	entirely.121		Moreover,	
to	 the	 extent	 states	 struggle	 with	 budget	 shortfalls,	 the	 federal	
government	is	far	better	placed	financially	to	address	these	problems	of	
national	significance.			
Federal	 proposals,	 however,	 even	 when	 they	 exist,	 have	
historically	come	up	short.		The	United	States	currently	does	not	have	a	






drug	 prices.122	 	 And,	 despite	 bipartisan	 support	 in	 Congress	 and	 an	
explicit	 commitment	 by	 the	 prior	 Administration	 to	 address	 the	
problem	of	excessively	priced	medications,	federal	solutions	have	been	
largely	 stalled	 or	 ineffective.	 	 Over	 the	 past	 few	 years,	 the	 most	
prominent	legislative	proposals	for	drug	pricing	reform	have	focused	on	
Medicare.123	 	Yet,	these	efforts	in	both	the	Senate	and	the	House	went	




and	 Congress.	 	 President	 Biden’s	 recent	 Executive	 Order	 to	 Promote	
Competition	in	the	American	Economy	explicitly	supports	“aggressive	
 



















drug-pricing-reduction-act-of-2019;	 Elijah	 E.	 Cummings	 Lower	 Drug	 Costs	 Now	Act,	
H.R.	3,	116th	Cong.	(as	passed	by	the	House,	Dec.	12,	2019).	






handling	 of	 discounts	 in	 Medicare	 Part	 D,	 passing	 on	 340B	 savings	 to	 underserved	
patients,	 and	 use	 of	 an	 international	 pricing	 index	 within	 Medicare	 Part	 B.	 	 Trump	
Administration	Announces	Historic	Action	to	Lower	Drug	Prices	for	Americans,	U.S.	DEP’T	
OF	HEALTH	&	HUM.	SERVS.,	NEWS	RELEASE	 (July	 24,	 2020),	 https://www.hhs.gov/about/
news/2020/07/24/trump-administration-announces-historic-action-lower-drug-
prices-americans.html.	 	 The	 response	 to	 these	 orders	 was	 underwhelming.	 	 Sydney	






Secretary	 of	 Health	 and	Human	 Services,	 Xavier	 Becerra,	was	 tasked	
with	 generating	 a	 plan	 to	 “combat	 excessive	 pricing	 of	 prescription	
drugs.”127	 	 Recently	 released,	 this	 plan	 identifies	 both	 legislative	 and	
administrative	 levers	 for	 improving	 drug	 affordability,	 promoting	
competition,	 and	 fostering	 scientific	 innovation.128	 	 Legislative	
proposals	include	reforms	to	Medicare	to	permit	drug	price	negotiation	
and	cap	out-of-pocket	costs,	legislation	to	address	price	increases,	and	
legislation	 to	 improve	 generic	 and	 biosimilar	 competition.129		
Administrative	 reforms	 include	 testing	 the	 use	 of	 “value-based	
payments	 in	 Medicare	 Part	 B,”	 efforts	 to	 improve	 transparency	 and	
competition,	 and	 the	 development	 of	 drug	 importation	 programs.130		
Meanwhile,	Congress	has	been	re-considering	the	ability	of	Medicare	to	
negotiate	 maximum	 fair	 prices	 for	 certain	 single	 source	 drugs131	
enforced	 through	 the	 imposition	 of	 not	 insignificant	 civil	 monetary	
penalties.132	 	 In	 earlier	 iterations,	 individuals	 enrolled	 in	 commercial	
plans	 could	 also	 benefit	 from	 these	 negotiations,	 unless	 their	 plans	
opted	out.133			
The	federal	drug	pricing	reform	landscape	has	been	more	dynamic	
than	 in	 recent	 memory.	 	 But	 barriers	 to	 federal-level	 reform	 are	




	 128	 XAVIER	 BECERRA,	 U.S.	 DEP’T	 OF	 HEALTH	 &	 HUM.	 SERVS.,	 COMPREHENSIVE	 PLAN	 FOR	









	 134	 Consider,	 for	 instance,	 that	pharmaceutical	 industry	 spending	on	 lobbying	and	
congressional	 campaign	 contributions	 is	notoriously	 strategic	 and	generous.	 	Among	
other	examples,	 these	dynamics	were	on	display	with	the	2020	Senate	races.	 	A	blue	
wave	 across	 the	 executive	 branch	 and	 both	 houses	 of	 Congress	 was	 deemed	 “a	
nightmare	scenario	for	drug	companies,”	and	their	political	spending	therefore	reflected	
their	 “clear	 stake	 in	keeping	 the	Senate	 in	Republican	hands.”	 	 Lev	Facher	&	Kaitlyn	
Bartley,	Pharma	Is	Showering	Congress	with	Cash,	Even	as	Drug	Makers	Race	to	Fight	the	
Coronavirus,	 STAT	 NEWS	 (Aug.	 10,	 2020),	 https://www.statnews.com/feature/
prescription-politics/prescription-politics/.	 	Senate	Majority	Leader	Mitch	McConnell,	










not	 necessarily	 new	 ideas,	 but	 the	 legal	 and	 political	 ability	 to	
implement	existing	proposals.”135			
The	 specific	 proposal	 for	 Medicare	 negotiation	 has	 been	
contentious	with	“three	key	democrats”	announcing	earlier	this	fall	that	









would	move	 forward	 without	 any	 drug	 pricing	 reform	 provisions.139		
Despite	 the	 President	 spending	 “countless	 hours	 with	 members	 of	




deal	 is	 again	 under	 consideration.141	 	 This	 compromise	 currently	






	 135	 Rachel	 Sachs,	Biden	Drug	Pricing	Plan	 Seeks	To	Balance	Access	 and	 Innovation,	






















operative	 until	 an	 initial	 post-approval	market	 period	 had	 passed.144		
Reactions	 to	 this	 draft	 compromise	 have,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 noted	 its	





Against	 a	 background	of	 continued	 federal	 gridlock,	 uncertainty,	
and	 proposals	 predominantly	 targeting	 specific	 federal	 programs,	 a	
search	 for	 “second-best	 solutions”	 is	 compelling.	 	 A	 second-best	
solution,	as	the	phrase	is	used	here,	represents	a	policy	that	might	be	
non-ideal	in	some	respects,	yet	in	light	of	real-world	imperfections	is	the	
most	 desirable	 of	 available	 options	 to	 achieve	 a	 policy	 goal.147	 	 This	
Article	argues	that	we	can	look	to	state	level	excessive	pricing	regulation	







not	 our	 only	 option	 for	 addressing	 the	 unfairness	 and	 inefficiency	 of	





	 144	 	Sachs,	 supra	 note	 141;	 Build	 Back	 Better	 Act,	 H.R.	 5376,	 117th	 Cong.	 §	













For	 the	reasons	discussed	above,	however,	 state-level	 intervention	 to	
curb	excessive	patented	drug	pricing	is	less	preferable	to	federal	reform.		
In	virtue	of	their	jurisdictional	limitations,	state	reform	efforts	will	be	
necessarily	 geographically	 constrained	 to	 particular	 populations.		
Further,	 the	 legal	maneuvers	 available	 to	 states	 are	more	 restricted;	
they	must	navigate	 regulating	 in	 the	shadow	of	avoiding	preemption,	
which	can	impose	additional	limitations	on	the	reach	of	reforms.		Thus,	
if	the	achievement	of	a	particular	health	policy	outcome—widespread	
fairer	 and	 more	 efficient	 prices	 for	 patented	 medications	 for	 all	




all.	 	 States	 have	 been	 experimenting	 with	 a	 number	 of	 different	
proposals	to	address	excessive	pricing,	to	control	costs,	and	to	improve	
the	affordability	of	prescription	medications	for	their	constituents.	 	In	
contrast	 to	 the	 federal	 government,	 states	 are	 both	 motivated	 to	
implement	drug	pricing	 reform	and,	 perhaps	more	 importantly,	 have	
the	demonstrated	political	ability	to	pass	a	variety	of	new	legislation.148		
States	 stepping	 into	 the	 role	 of	 excessive	 patented	 drug	 price	
reformers,	 because	 the	 federal	 government	 has	 been	 politically	
incapacitated,	further	offers	the	prospect	of	ancillary	benefits	by	way	of	
values	traditionally	associated	with	federalism.		While	state	drug	pricing	
reform	 largely	 appears	 motivated	 by	 ideals	 of	 instrumental	
federalism—that	 is,	 federalism	 in	 the	 service	 of	 a	 particular	 policy	
goal—some	state	efforts	do	exude	qualities	consistent	with	“federalism	
for	 federalism’s	 own	 sake.”149	 	 These	 qualities	 include	 increased	
accountability	to	constituents,	experimentation,	and	expression	of	local	
preferences	and	values.150	 	For	instance,	in	the	adjacent	arena	of	drug	
pricing	 transparency	 legislation,	Nevada’s	new	 laws	 focus	 specifically	
on	medicines	for	health	conditions	of	particular	salience	to	the	state—
diabetes	 and	 asthma.151	 	 In	 the	 present	 context,	 state	 regulation	
involving	determinations	of	excessive	pricing	schemes	exemplifies	local	
experimentation	 with	 difficult	 moral	 and	 policy	 considerations	
regarding	unfair	and	excessive	drug	pricing.	
 










That	 states—subject	 to	 avoiding	 or	 overcoming	 preemption	
headwinds—can	be	excessive	patented	drug	pricing	reformers	does	not	
yet	 address	 the	 issue	 of	 how	 such	 a	 second-best	 solution	 might	 be	
implemented.	 	 To	 answer	 this	 question,	 two	 primary	 kinds	 of	 policy	
tools	 are	 available:	 price	 regulation	 and	 payment	 regulation.	 	 Price	
regulation	 sets	 the	 prices	 that	 drug	 manufacturers	 (or,	 perhaps	
additionally,	others	within	the	supply	chain)	can	charge	for	the	sale	of	
patented	prescription	medications.152		Payment	regulation,	by	contrast,	
regulates	 the	amount	 that	payors	or	purchasers	can	pay	 for	patented	
prescription	 medications.153	 	 It	 does	 not	 restrict	 how	 much	 a	 drug	
manufacturer	 can	 charge.	 	 The	 former	 type	 of	 regulation	 focuses	 on	
seller	conduct,	the	latter	on	buyer	conduct.		
Price	 regulation	 and	 payment	 regulation	 tackle	 the	 problem	 of	





While	 price	 and	 payment	 regulation	 could	 theoretically	 achieve	
similar	 results,	 there	 are	 moral	 and	 political	 reasons	 to	 favor	 price	
regulation.154		From	a	moral	perspective,	the	primary	aim	of	government	
regulation	in	this	space	is	to	prohibit	unfair	and	excessive	patented	drug	
pricing.	 	 This	 is	 exactly	what	 price	 regulation	 does.	 	 It	 identifies	 the	
problematic	conduct	and	directly	prohibits	the	responsible	actor	from	
treating	others	in	morally	problematic	ways.		It	prevents	patent	holders	
from	 charging	 unfair	 prices	 and	 charging	 more	 than	 necessary	 in	
furtherance	of	the	goals	of	federal	patent	law.		Payment	regulation,	by	
contrast,	 does	 not	 prohibit	 unfair	 or	 problematic	 conduct;	 drug	
manufacturers	remain	free	to	price	their	drugs	unfairly	and	excessively.		
Payment	 regulation	 puts	 the	 onus	 of	 preventing	 unfair	 or	 excessive	




	 154	 See	Govind	 Persad,	 Pricing	 Drugs	 Fairly,	 62	WM.	&	MARY	L.	REV.	929,	973–977	
(2021)	(arguing	in	favor	of	price	regulation).		Considerations	of	ERISA	preemption	could	
offer	 an	 additional	 reason	 to	 prefer	 price	 regulation.	 	 Payment	 regulatory	 schemes	
designed	to	avoid	ERISA	preemption	could	be	of	more	limited	reach	than	a	comparative	
price	regulation.		See,	e.g.,	Rachel	E.	Sachs,	The	National	Academy	for	State	Health	Policy’s	
Proposal	 for	 State-Based	 International	 Reference	 Pricing	 for	 Prescription	Drugs,	 NAT’L	
ACAD.	 FOR	 ST.	 HEALTH	 POL’Y	 (Aug.	 10,	 2020),	 https://www.nashp.org/the-national-
academy-for-state-health-policys-proposal-for-state-based-international-reference-








regarding	 excessively	 priced	 patented	 medications	 as	 one	 between	
patients	 and	payors	on	 the	one	hand	and	drug	manufacturers	on	 the	
other.	 	 Payment	 regulation	 reframes	 the	 terms	 of	 the	 debate	 in	 an	
unhelpful	way.155		The	debate	about	access	and	expensive	medications	
becomes	 a	 conflict	 between	 patients	 and	 payors.156	 	 It	 refocuses	 the	
debate	 from	 excessive	 and	 unfair	 pricing	 to	 potentially	 ungenerous	
spending.		Payment	regulation	poses	the	political	problem	of	potentially	
restricting	 access	 to	 drugs	 already	 in	 use	 by	 beneficiaries	 if	 drug	
manufacturers	are	not	willing	participants.157			
As	one	example	of	how	this	reframing	can	alter	 the	 terms	of	 the	
debate,	 consider	 the	plight	of	parents	whose	 toddlers	suffer	 from	the	
debilitating,	 if	 not	 fatal,	 genetic	 disorder	 of	 spinal	muscular	 atrophy.		
Novartis’	Zolgensma	has	been	hailed	as	a	miracle	drug.158	 	 It	requires	
just	a	single	 infusion	 to	be	administered	before	a	patient	reaches	her	
second	birthday	 and	 can	be	potentially	 curative.159	 	 The	drug’s	price,	
however,	 is	 $2.1	 million	 which	 has	 led	 to	 highly	 publicized	 battles	
between	parents	and	insurers,	with	many	patients	being,	at	least	prior	








	 158	 Linda	 Carroll	 &	 Lauren	 Dunn,	 $2.1	Million	 Drug	 to	 Treat	 Rare	 Genetic	 Disease	
Approved	 by	 FDA,	 NBC	 (May	 24,	 2019),	 https://www.nbcnews.com/health/health-
news/2-1-million-drug-treat-rare-genetic-disease-approved-fda-n1009956;	 Shraddha	
Chakradhar,	‘Maisie’s	Army’:	How	a	Grassroots	Group	is	Mobilizing	to	Help	Toddlers	Access	
a	 Lifesaving	 Drug,	 STAT	NEWS	 (August	 20,	 2019),	 https://www.statnews.com/2019/















While	 there	 are	moral	 and	 political	 reasons	 to	 favor	 state	 level	
price	 regulation	over	 state	 level	payment	 regulation,	 a	key	 feature	of	
second-best	solutions	 is	that	they	must	offer	pragmatic	and	workable	










prices	 were	 “threatening	 the	 health	 and	 welfare	 of	 residents	 of	 the	
District”	 and	 that	 “[t]he	 traditional	 police	 powers	 of	 the	 District	 of	
Columbia	 include	 protecting	 and	 promoting	 the	 health,	 safety,	 and	
welfare	of	its	residents	.	.	.	.”167		
In	light	of	these	findings,	the	Act	therefore	made	it	“unlawful”	for	
drug	 manufacturers	 and	 licensees	 “to	 sell	 or	 supply	 for	 sale”	 any	
patented	prescription	medications	for	an	excessive	price	within	D.C.168		
Though	 the	 Act	 did	 not	 define	 “excessive,”	 it	 created	 a	 rebuttable	























Kingdom,	 Germany,	 Canada,	 and	 Australia.170	 	 As	 a	 rebuttable	
presumption,	a	defendant	could	try	to	justify	its	“excessive”	prices.171		To	




for	 the	 drug’s	 development;	 and	 the	 price’s	 impact	 on	 access	 to	 the	
drug.172		The	Act	was	broad	both	in	terms	of	who	could	sue	to	enforce	
the	Act’s	provisions	and	the	range	of	available	remedies.173		
The	 two	 major	 industry	 trade	 organizations—Biotechnology	
Industry	 Organization	 (“BIO”)	 and	 Pharmaceutical	 Researchers	 and	




for	 states	 in	 crafting	 their	 policy	 interventions	 impacting	 excessively	
priced	patented	medications,	 its	discussion	and	analysis	are	reserved	
for	a	detailed	discussion	below.	
This	 adverse	 ruling	 regarding	 patent	 preemption,	 however,	 has	
inspired	states	over	the	years	to	shift	their	focus	in	drafting	excessive	
pricing	 laws	 to	 generics	 and	 inspired	 increased	 interest	 in	 payment	
regulation.176	 	 Among	 anti-price	 gouging	 proposals	 in	 the	 2021	
legislative	 session,	 a	 focus	 on	 generics	 predominates.177	 	 States,	
however,	 over	 the	 past	 few	 years	 have	 still	 put	 forward	 proposed	
legislation	with	the	ability	to	reach	patented	medications.	
Minnesota’s	HF	4	provides	an	example.178		This	bill	prohibited	the	























section	 is	 intended	 to	 address	 such	 abuses,	 but	 allow	 drug	
manufacturers	and	wholesale	drug	distributors	a	fair	rate	of	
return	 with	 respect	 to	 their	 sale	 of	 essential	 prescription	
drugs	in	the	state	of	Minnesota.180	













have	 narrower	 applications.	 	 For	 instance,	 a	New	York	 bill	 sought	 to	
focus	exclusively	on	price	increases	above	the	cost	of	living	for	“critical	
prescription	 drugs,”	 defined	 as	 those	 drugs	 that	 are	 “necessary	 to	
prevent	 or	 treat	 a	 disease	 or	 state	 in	 which	 death	 is	 possible	 or	
imminent.”185	 	By	contrast,	a	bill	 in	New	Jersey	focused	exclusively	on	
“prohibit[ing]	 any	 person	 from	 charging	 excessive	 prices	 for	 drugs	
developed	 by	 publicly	 funded	 research.”186	 	 Excessive	 pricing	 is	
determined	by	reference	to	the	lowest	price	charged	in	certain	foreign	
jurisdictions.187		Still	other	excessive	drug	pricing	bills	have	limited	their	
reach	 to	 times	 of	 emergency	 and	market	 shortages.	 	 A	 bill	 in	 Rhode	

















that—rather	 than	 regulate	 drug	 prices	 directly—levies	 a	 fine	 or	 tax	




to	 increase	 prices,	 increases	 deemed	 “unsupported”	 or	 “excessive”	
would	 be	 subject	 to	 a	 penalty.191	 	 Existing	 proposals	 reach	 patented	
medications.	
Massachusetts	 Bill	 H.1,	 the	 Governor’s	 proposed	 budget,	 for	
instance,	included	provisions	applicable	to	any	FDA	approved	drug.192		
Under	 these	 provisions,	 drug	 manufacturers	 would	 have	 to	 pay	 a	
penalty	equal	to	80	percent	of	that	portion	of	a	price	increase	deemed	
excessive	per	unit	“of	the	drug	ultimately	dispensed	or	administered	in	
the	 commonwealth.”193	 	 Excessive	 price	 increases	 are	 determined	 by	
starting	with	the	reference	price	of	the	drug	which	is	defined	to	be	the	
wholesale	acquisition	cost	(“WAC”)	of	the	drug,	per	unit,	as	of	January	1,	
2021,	 or	 if	 a	 drug	 was	 not	 yet	 on	 the	 market,	 the	 date	 it	 was	 first	
marketed.194	 	 Using	 this	 reference	 price	 as	 a	 baseline,	 drug	
manufacturers	are	permitted	to	increase	a	drug’s	price	by	the	consumer	
price	 index	 plus	 an	 additional	 2	 percent	 of	 the	 reference	 price	
annually.195		Price	increases	beyond	this	are	deemed	excessive,	and	drug	
 




STATE	 HEALTH	 POL’Y,	 https://www.nashp.org/rx-legislative-tracker/	 (noting	 five		
unsupported	price	hike	bills)	(last	visited	Oct.	28,	2021).	
	 191	 These	proposals	 have	 features	 in	 common	with	payment	 regulation	 insofar	 as	

















Rather	 than	 regulate	 patented	 drug	 prices	 for	 excessiveness,	
payment	 regulation	 offers	 an	 alternative.	 	 One	 recent	 permutation	 of	
payment	reform	is	out-of-pocket	caps	for	patients	taking	insulin.	 	U.S.	
prices	 for	 insulin	 have	 been	 a	 particularly	 fraught	 subject	 in	
controversies	over	drug	pricing.		Insulin	prices	have	risen	dramatically;	
the	same	$1,487	vial	of	 insulin	 in	2019	might	have	only	cost	$175.57	
fifteen	 years	 earlier.197	 	 Between	 2012	 and	 2016,	 prices	 nearly	
doubled.198	 	 Patients	 can	 end	 up	 paying	 thousands	 of	 dollars	 for	 this	









The	 National	 Academy	 for	 State	 Health	 Policy	 (“NASHP”)	 has	
advocated	for	a	different	approach	to	payment	regulation.		It	provided	
model	 legislation	 for	Drug	Affordability	Review	Boards	 (“DABs”)	 that	
 
	 196	 Id.	§§	28	Ch.	63E(1–2).	
	 197	 Nicholas	Florko,	 ‘Everyone	 Is	at	Fault’:	With	 Insulin	Prices	Skyrocketing,	There’s	
Plenty	of	Blame	to	Go	Around,	STAT	NEWS	(Feb.	19,	2019),	https://www.statnews.com/
2019/02/19/no-generic-insulin-who-is-to-blame/.	
	 198	 Ed	Silverman,	 Insulin	Costs	 for	U.S.	Patients	Nearly	Doubled	 from	2012	Through	
2016,	but	Usage	Was	Flat,	STAT	NEWS	(Feb.	19,	2019),	https://www.statnews.com/phar-
malot/2019/01/22/insulin-drug-prices-diabetes/.	
	 199	 See	Anna	Staver,	Colorado	Becomes	First	State	 in	Nation	 to	Cap	Price	of	 Insulin,	
DENVER	POST	(May	23,	2019),	https://www.denverpost.com/2019/05/23/colorado-in-
sulin-price-cap/.	




	 201	 Meg	Wingerter,	Lawmaker	 Looks	 to	 Close	 “Loophole”	 in	 Colorado’s	 First-in-the-
Nation	 Insulin	Price	 Cap,	DENVER	POST	 (Jan.	 10,	 2020),	 https://www.denverpost.com/
2020/01/10/colorado-insulin-price-cap-loophole/.	
	 202	 See	Nicholas	Florko,	State	Legislatures	Are	Lapping	 the	Federal	Government	On	








Maryland’s	 passage	 of	 HB	 768	 is	 perhaps	 the	 most	 high-profile	
example	 of	 this	 idea’s	 realization.204	 	 In	 2019,	 Maryland	 created	 its	
Prescription	Drug	Affordability	Board	 (“Board”)	with	 the	purpose	 “to	
protect	State	residents,	State	and	local	governments,	commercial	health	
plans,	health	care	providers,	pharmacies	licensed	in	the	State,	and	other	
stakeholders	 within	 the	 health	 care	 system	 from	 the	 high	 costs	 of	
prescription	drug	products.”205		Comprised	of	members	with	expertise	
in	 medicine	 and	 health	 economics,206	 the	 Board	 is	 charged	 with	
identifying	prescription	drugs	that	pose	affordability	challenges.207		For	
brand	drugs	and	biologics,	these	are	drugs	that	launch	with	a	WAC	of	
greater	 or	 equal	 to	 $30,000	 annually	 or	 per	 course	 of	 treatment;	 or	
drugs	that	have	a	WAC	increase	of	greater	or	equal	to	$3,000	annually	
or	per	course	of	 treatment,	 if	 shorter.208	 	The	Board	will	also	 identify	
biosimilars	that	are	not	at	least	15	percent	cheaper	than	the	referenced	
biologic	 at	 launch,	 and	 generic	 drugs	 that	 are	 $100	or	more	meeting	
certain	 criteria.209	 	 A	 catchall	 clause	 permits	 the	 identification	 of	 any	
“other	prescription	drug[s]	that	may	create	affordability	challenges.”210		
After	 identifying	 drugs	 that	 may	 be	 unaffordable,	 the	 Board	






factors,	 if	 the	 Board	 cannot	 determine	whether	 the	 drug	 has	 or	 will	
 
	 203	 See	 Nat’l	 Acad.	 for	 State	 Health	 Pol’y,	 supra	 note	 177	 (showing	 sixteen		



























Given	 that	 the	 implementation	of	upper	payment	 limits	 is	yet	 to	
occur,	 Maryland	 has	 not	 experienced	 litigation	 over	 its	 Prescription	
Drug	 Affordability	 Board.	 	 The	 Board,	 however,	 hit	 an	 unexpected	
speedbump.	 	 In	 May	 2020,	 the	 legislature	 passed	 a	 bill	 authorizing	
funding	for	the	Board	through	fee	collection	from	drug	manufacturers,	
pharmacy	benefit	managers,	insurers,	and	wholesale	distributers	not	to	





to	 achieve	 its	 objectives.	 	 In	 February	 2021,	 the	 Maryland	 House	 of	

























supplemental	 rebates	 from	 drug	 manufacturers.	 	 Nevertheless,	 state	
Medicaid	 programs	 have	 found	 that	 the	 cost	 of	 prescription	 drugs—
particularly	 new	 specialty	 drugs—have	 become	 increasingly	




Though	 trends	 change,	 an	 interesting	 historical	 feature	 of	 some	
state	 experimentation	 with	 Medicaid	 reform	 is	 the	 comparative	
emphasis	in	DABs	on	“value-based	pricing”	when	contrasted	with	non-




Themes	 of	 value-based	 pricing	 are	working	 their	way	 into	 state	
Medicaid	reform	in	at	 least	two	ways.	 	First,	consideration	of	a	drug’s	
value	is	being	incorporated	into	new	DAB	structures	in	New	York	and	
Massachusetts	 as	 the	 basis	 for	 negotiating	 increased	 supplemental	
rebates	on	high-cost	drugs.227		Second,	several	states—with	Oklahoma	
being	the	first—have	amended	their	state	plans	or	received	waivers	to	














McCluskey,	Pharmaceutical	 Industry	Mounts	Opposition	 to	 State’s	 Effort	 to	 Curb	Drug	









Moral	 and	 political	 reasons	warrant	 a	 preference	 for	 state-level	
price	 regulation	 over	 payment	 regulation,	 yet	 a	 second-best	 solution	
must	be	pragmatic	and	workable.	 	 State	excessive	price	 regulation	of	
patented	 medications	 faces	 several	 practical	 challenges.	 	 Most	
significantly,	excessive	price	regulation	confronts	the	doctrinal	barrier	
of	unfavorable	Federal	Circuit	precedent	in	BIO	v.	D.C.		As	already	noted,	
this	 case	 ruled	 that	 at	 least	 one	 version	 of	 an	 excessive	 drug	 pricing	
statute	was	patent	preempted.		This	precedent	is	flawed,	and	arguments	
in	 support	of	 the	District	of	Columbia,	 and	 state	 level	 excessive	price	
regulation	more	 generally,	 ought	 to	 be	 revived	 and	 revisited.229	 	 The	
alternative	 is	 rather	bleak:	 federal	 regulatory	 failure	 compounded	by	
neutered	state	regulation.			
Preemption	 of	 state	 law	 can	 take	 different	 pathways.230		
Preemption	 can	 be	 express.	 	 This	 occurs	when	 federal	 law	 explicitly	
preempts	 state	 law.231	 	 Neither	 the	 Intellectual	 Property	 Clause	 nor	
federal	statutory	patent	law	expressly	preempt	state	law.232		Indeed,	the	
Federal	Circuit	acknowledged	 that	 “[t]here	 is	no	express	provision	 in	











	 230	 Murphy	v.	Nat’l	Collegiate	Athletic	Ass’n,	138	S.	Ct.	1461,	1480	 (2018)	 (noting	
three	types	of	preemption).	
	 231	 The	Copyright	Act,	 for	 instance,	 has	 an	 express	 preemption	provision.	 	See	 17	
U.S.C.	§	301.	
	 232	 Jeanne	C.	Fromer,	The	Intellectual	Property	Clause’s	Preemptive	Effect,	 in	 INTELL.	
PROP.	&	COMMON	L.	265	 (Shram	 Rrishna	 Balganesh	 ed.,	2013);	Camilla	 A.	 Hrdy,	 State	
Patents	as	a	Solution	to	Underinvestment	 in	 Innovation,	62	U.	KAN.	L.	REV.	487,	525–26	












The	 district	 court	 in	 this	 litigation	 agreed	 with	 the	 trade	
associations’	argument	that	the	federal	patent	 laws,	and	in	particular,	
the	Hatch-Waxman	Act,	“reflect	Congress’	considered	judgment	of	the	
economic	 incentives	 and	 protections	 necessary	 to	 best	 promote	 the	
development	 of	 new	medications.”237	 	 The	 D.C.	 Act,	 according	 to	 the	
court,	 therefore	 impermissibly	 interfered	with	 Congress’s	 considered	
incentive	scheme.		The	district	court	wrote:	
How	 then	 does	 the	 D.C.	 Act’s	 thinly	 veiled	 effort	 to	 force	
manufacturers	to	limit	the	wholesale	price	of	those	drugs	to	
less	 than	 30%	more	 than	 the	 wholesale	 price	 of	 the	 same	
patented	 drugs	 sold	 in	 four	 designated	 “high	 income”	
countries	 square	 with	 the	 congressional	 purpose	 and	








The	Federal	Circuit	Court	of	Appeals	 affirmed.	 	According	 to	 the	






	 236	 For	 those	 wondering	 about	 field	 preemption—when	 the	 federal	 regulatory	
scheme	is	so	pervasive	as	to	infer	that	Congress	left	no	room	for	state	regulation—it	is	
unlikely	in	this	context.		Field	preemption	is	a	“rarer	form”	of	preemption.		Elizabeth	Y.	
McCuskey,	 Body	 of	 Preemption:	 Health	 Law	 Traditions	 and	 the	 Presumption	 Against	
Preemption,	89	TEMP.	L.	REV.	95,	103	(2016).		Further,	as	others	observe,	it	is	not	“likely	
that	field	preemption	exists”	in	the	case	of	patents	and	price	regulation.		Feldman	et	al.,	















the	 absence	of	 competition,	 and	 “‘[t]hese	profits	 act	 as	 incentives	 for	






which	 Congress	 has	 exclusive	 authority.245	 	 “Congress,	 as	 the	
promulgator	of	patent	policy,”	 is	 the	 final	arbiter	of	how	that	balance	
between	exclusive	rights	and	the	public	domain	is	struck.246		In	light	of	




patent”	 and	 “shift[ing]	 the	 benefits	 of	 a	 patented	 invention	 from	
inventors	 to	 consumers.”248	 	 Furthermore,	 the	court	 stated	 that	D.C.’s	





argued	 that,	 far	 from	 “determin[ing]	what	 price	 is	 necessary	 to	 spur	
innovation”	(which	he	thinks	would	be	preempted),251	the	Act	actually	
regulates	 price	 discrimination.252	 	 Regulating	 for	 pricing	 parity	
























regulation	does	not—it	does	not	 conflict.255	 	 Judge	Dyk	 further	noted	
that	the	panel,	 in	his	opinion,	did	not	give	adequate	attention	to	state	
police	powers.256	
In	 response,	 Judge	 Gajarsa’s	 concurrence	 accused	 the	 dissent	 of	
“sophistry.”257	 	Whatever	 the	purported	purpose	of	 the	Act,	 it	 “was	 a	





for	 above-market	 profits.260	 	 According	 to	 Judge	 Gajarsa,	 the	 Hatch-
Waxman	Act	underscored	the	particular	importance	of	these	rights	for	
medications	 by	 restoring	 patent	 terms	 in	 light	 of	 the	 FDA	 approval	
process.261	 	 Moreover,	 he	 argued,	 because	 the	 Hatch-Waxman	 Act	
facilitates	competitive	markets	upon	patent	expiration	due	to	concern	
for	 medications’	 costs,	 Congress	 clearly	 identified	 how	 it	 thinks	 the	
balance	between	innovation	and	access	should	be	set.262			
Thus,	according	to	Judge	Gajarsa,	states	need	to	stay	in	their	lane.		

























patent-derived	 profits	 is	 preempted	 if	 that	 regulation	 only	 does	 so	
“incidentally”	 and	 does	 not	 “significantly	 and	 directly	 impede[]	
Congress’s	purpose	in	providing	the	federal	patent	right.”264	
This	 does	 not	mean	 that	 any	 state	 regulation	 that	 affects	 a	
patentee’s	 profits	 so	 undermines	 the	 goals	 of	 the	 patent	
system	as	to	be	preempted.		It	is	well	established	that	states	




patented	 products	 does	 not	mean	 that	 they	 have	 unlimited	
ability	 to	 do	 so	 in	 situations	 in	 which	 the	 regulation	
significantly	 and	 directly	 impedes	 Congress’s	 purpose	 in	
providing	the	federal	patent	right.265	
Judge	Gajarsa	concluded	his	concurrence	by	asserting	that	the	dissent	
“overstates	 the	 breath”	 of	 the	 opinion.266	 	 It	 does	 not	 “require	 the	
preemption	 of	 ‘any	 state	 law	 regulating	 the	 prices	 of	 patented	
pharmaceutical	products.’”267		The	opinion	is	specific	to	the	facts	of	the	
D.C.	Act,	 and	 a	different	 state	 law	 regulating	drug	prices	might	 avoid	
preemption	 if	 it	 “did	 not	 only	 target	 patent	 [sic]	 drugs	 or	 did	 not	 as	
significantly	 or	 directly	 undermine	 the	 balance	 of	 the	 federal	 patent	
right.”268	
As	previously	mentioned,	BIO	v.	D.C.	has	seemingly	had	a	chilling	




or	 explicitly	 cover	 patented	 medications,	 the	 focus	 for	 this	 kind	 of	
legislation	has	generally	shifted	to	generic,	off-patent	medications.269		
Even	 though	 addressing	 the	 excessive	 costs	 of	 patented	
medications	is	urgent	for	both	patients	and	health	systems,	with	limited	


























of	 treatment.274	 	 The	 plaintiffs	 alleged	 that,	 despite	Gilead	 selling	 the	
active	 ingredient	 in	 these	 drugs	 (sofosbuvir)	 for	 much	 less	 in	 other	
countries	and	giving	discounts	to	certain	federal	agencies,	the	pricing	of	
their	 hepatitis	 C	 drugs	 thwarted	 domestic	 access	 through	 insurer	
rationing.275		In	light	of	these	“bogus”	and	“exorbitant	prices,”	plaintiffs	
sued	 Gilead	 “to	 stop	 this	 unconscionable	 and	 unfair	 conduct,	 and	 to	
secure	 appropriate	 relief	 for	 consumers	 and	 third	 party	 payers	 who	
have	been	victimized	by	Gilead’s	price	gouging	scheme.”276		Plaintiffs	put	







Busch,	 Speaker	 of	 the	 House,	 Maryland	 State	 House	 (May	 26,	 2017),	 https://con-
tent.govdelivery.com/attachments/MDGOV/2017/05/26/file_attachments/822635/





	 272	 Cf.	 In	 re	EpiPen	(Epinephrine	 Injection,	USP)	Mktg.,	 Sales	Practices	&	Antitrust	
Litig.,	336	F.	Supp.	3d	1256,	1333–1334	(D.	Kan.	2018)	(rejecting	Mylan’s	arguments	
that	 state	 consumer	 protection	 claims	 alleging	marketplace	misconduct	 resulting	 in	
higher	 EpiPen	 prices	 were	 patent	 preempted).	 	 Reconciling	 this	 case	 with	 SEPTA		
suggests	 a	 distinction	 between	 regulation	 of	 a	 pricing	 scheme	 and	 unfair	 conduct		
impacting	price.	












court	 found	 Gilead’s	 patent	 preemption	 arguments	 to	 be	
“devastating.”279		Relying	on	BIO	v.	D.C.,	Gilead	argued	“that	‘[g]iven	that	













problematic	 in	 part	 because,	 by	 singling	 out	 patented	medications,	 it	
was	“in	no	way	general.”282		Thus,	the	court	implied	that	a	law	of	general	
application	 might	 be	 able	 to	 avoid	 patent	 preemption.	 	 SEPTA	
undermines	 this	 language.	 	Gilead’s	 interpretation	of	BIO	v.	D.C.,	with	
which	 the	 court	 appears	 inclined	 to	 agree,	 deliberately	 attacks	 this	
guidance.		In	contrast	to	the	Federal	Circuit,	this	court	suggests	that	state	
laws	 of	 any	 kind,	 whether	 general	 or	 particular,	 will	 be	 patent	
preempted	when	used	to	address	 the	prices	of	patented	medications;	




prima	facie	compelling	arguments,	as	 the	court	 lays	out,	 to	 think	that	
state	 price	 regulation	 of	 patented	 medications	 ought	 to	 be	 patent	















Yet,	 as	 argued	 below,	 Congress	 had	 not	 and	 still	 (more	 than	 a	
decade	 later)	 has	 not	 addressed	 the	 problem	 of	 excessively-priced	
patented	 medications	 during	 the	 patent	 period.	 	 Thus,	 there	 is	 a	
regulatory	vacuum	which	states	can	fill.		Further,	this	is	a	vacuum	that	
states	should	fill.		Preemption	is	costly,	both	in	human	and	fiscal	terms.		
The	 existing	 federal	 patent	 scheme,	 operating	 without	 federal	
correction,	imposes	tragic	choices	on	individuals	and	states.		These	costs	







preemption	 jurisprudence	 involves	 “two	 cornerstones.”285	 	 First,	
congressional	purpose	is	the	“ultimate	touchstone.”286		Second,	there	is	
a	presumption	“that	the	historic	police	powers	of	the	States	[are]	not	to	
be	 superseded	 .	.	.	 [absent]	 the	 clear	 and	 manifest	 purpose	 of	
Congress.”287		
Beginning	 with	 the	 latter,	 while	 much	 about	 the	 presumption	
against	preemption	is	debated,288	it	remains	an	ongoing	tool	in	Supreme	
Court	 preemption	 analysis.289	 	 The	 Federal	 Circuit	 in	 BIO	 v.	 D.C.,	
however,	gives	 it	 but	 a	 glancing	 look.290	 	 The	 court	 simply	notes	 that	
D.C.’s	“general	police	power	within	its	borders”	is	“unquestioned,”	as	is	


















general	 authority	 of	 the	 State	 over	 all	 property	 within	 its	 limits.’”291		
Presumably,	 because	 it	 found	 the	D.C.	Act	 to	 conflict	with	 the	Hatch-
Waxman	Act,	the	court	concludes	in	the	next	sentence	that	“general	state	
power	must	yield	to	specific	congressional	enactment.”292	 	Since	D.C.’s	
law	 was	 not	 general,	 it	 stood	 “exclusively[]	 within	 the	 scope	 of	 the	
patent	laws.”293	
In	 light	 of	 a	 tension	 between	 the	 Supremacy	 Clause	 and	 the	














exists	 among	 courts	 and	 commentators	 that	 state	 regulations	 for	 the	
health,	safety,	and	welfare	for	their	citizens	are	within	the	boundaries	of	

































Court	 explicitly	 stated	 that	 states’	 ability	 to	 regulate	 any	 aspect	 of	 a	
business	 includes	 product	 pricing.307	 	 As	 with	 “any	 other	 form	 of	
regulation,”	 state	 price	 regulations	 are	 “unconstitutional	 only	 if	
arbitrary,	discriminatory,	or	demonstrably	irrelevant	to	the	policy	the	
legislature	is	free	to	adopt.”308		
Furthermore,	 the	mere	 fact	 that	 a	 regulated	product	 is	 patented	
does	not	automatically	displace	appropriate	regulation	under	a	state’s	
police	powers.309		State	legislation	that	can	be	adopted	in	the	absence	of	







general	 authority	 of	 the	 State	 over	 all	 property	 within	 its		
limits.311	
The	 Court	 specified,	 however,	 that	 states	 cannot	 interfere	 with	 “the	
incorporeal	 right”—the	 exclusive	 rights	 granted	 to	 patent	 holders.312		

















It	 may	 seem	 a	 close	 call	 whether	 excessive	 drug	 pricing	 laws	
regulate	 the	 product	 or	 the	 underlying	 right.	 	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	
regulation	of	patented	drug	prices	 implicates	the	amount	of	reward	a	




price	a	drug	manufacturer	 can	 charge	 for	 its	patented	product.	 	Why	






states	 to	 tax	 patent	 royalties313	 and	 to	 prohibit	 the	 sale	 of	 patented	













ought	 to	 be	 accorded	 a	 presumption	 against	 preemption.	 	 The	
fundamental	purpose	of	these	regulations	is	to	protect	the	health	and	
welfare	of	a	state’s	citizens,	and	regulations	of	this	kind	have	long	been	
considered	within	 the	police	powers	 of	 states.	 	 These	 are	 reasonable	
regulations	that	states	can	use	to	achieve	their	legitimate	goals.		
Moreover,	 as	 argued	 below,	 there	 is	 no	 “clear	 and	 manifest	











excessive	 pricing,	 or	 state	 payment	 regulation	 impacting	 patented	
products.	 	 The	 presumption	 is	 not	 rebutted.	 	 There	 is	 no	 obstacle	
preemption:	excessive	price	regulation	need	not	be	an	impediment	to	
federal	 purposes.	 	 The	 prices	 of	 patented	 drug	 products	 are	 almost	
completely	 unregulated	 federally,	 and	 there	 is	 no	 constitutional	 nor	
congressional	 purpose	 to	 guarantee	 patent-holders	 certain	 economic	
rewards.319	 	 The	 patent	 laws	 do	 not	 exist	 to	 enrich	 patent	 holders.		
Further,	 applying	 Judge	 Gajarsa’s	 suggested	 criteria,	 excessive	 price	










intellectual	property	must	 yield	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 it	 clashes	with	 the	
balance	struck	by	Congress	in	our	patent	laws.”322		That	balance	refers	
to	 the	 “tension	 between”	 free	 use	 of	 “inventive	 resources”	 and	 “an	
incentive	 to	 deploy	 those	 resources.”323	 	 “Where	 it	 is	 clear	 how	 the	
 
	 319	 See	supra	Part	II.	




























Yet,	 the	 Federal	 Circuit’s	 reliance	 on	 the	 Hatch-Waxman	 Act	 is	
misplaced.325		It	is	far	from	obvious	that	the	D.C.	Act—or	any	excessive	
price	 regulation	 more	 generally—must	 undermine	 the	 purposes	 and	











to	 the	 Federal	 Food,	 Drug,	 and	 Cosmetic	 Act,	 the	 FDA	 required	 drug	
manufacturers	 “to	 prove	 that	 their	 drugs	 were	 safe	 and	 efficacious	




to	restore	some	of	 the	 time	 lost	 to	 regulatory	review.332	 	Firms	could	
receive	up	to	an	additional	five	years	of	patent	exclusivity,	but	patent	
expiration	 could	 not	 be	 extended	 beyond	 fourteen	 years	 post-FDA	
 
	 324	 Id.	



















Act	 established	 several	 non-patent	 exclusivities	 for	 the	 FDA	 to	
implement.		For	instance,	new	chemical	entities	would	receive	five	years	
of	 data	 exclusivity,	 during	which	 time	 generic	 competitors	would	 be	
prevented	from	submitting	an	application	for	FDA	approval.334		
Second,	 and	 perhaps	 most	 importantly,	 the	 Hatch-Waxman	 Act	
sought	to	create	new	pathways	to	speed	up	market	entry	of	generics	and	
end	 the	 de	 facto	 exclusivity	 extension	 for	 originator	 drugs.335	 	 The	
Kefauver-Harris	 Amendments	 applied	 to	 FDA	 review	 of	 all	 drug	
manufacturers,	regardless	of	whether	they	were	originators	with	patent	
protection	or	generics	without;	all	drug	manufacturers	would	need	to	
expend	 substantial	 resources	 on	 new	 clinical	 trials	 to	 complete	 the	
regulatory	 process.336	 	 Yet,	 generics	 did	 not	 have	 strong	 economic	
incentives	 to	 enter	 the	market	 given	 a	 lack	of	 	 patent-protection,	 the	
existence	of	at	least	one	competitor,	and	the	expense	of	completing	the	
same	 regulatory	 requirements	 of	 originators.337	 	 Further,	 due	 to	 a	
Federal	 Circuit	 ruling,	 generic	manufacturers	were	 barred	 from	even	
beginning	 the	 testing	 necessary	 for	 FDA	 approval	 prior	 to	 the	
originator’s	 patent	 expiration.338	 	 This	 meant	 that	 patent-holders’	
period	of	exclusivity	enjoyed	a	de	facto	extension.339		To	remedy	these	
problems,	 the	 Hatch-Waxman	 Act	 created	 an	 abbreviated	 new	 drug	
application	pathway	 (“ANDA”),	 through	which	generic	manufacturers	
could	seek	FDA	approval.340		It	further	permitted	generic	manufacturers	




conditioned	 upon	 patent	 expiration,	 invalidation,	 or	 non-
infringement.343	 	 Through	 a	 180-day	 exclusivity	 period,344	 the	 Act	
incentivizes	generic	applicants	 to	challenge	an	originator’s	patents	as	
























or	otherwise—of	patented	medications.	 	 It	 facilitates	competition	and	
seeks	 to	 correct	 for	 time	 lost	 on	 patent	 protection	 by	 the	 regulatory	
process.	 	There	 is	no	 indication	of	 congressional	purpose	 to	preempt	
state	 price	 regulation	 through	 an	 inference	 about	 the	 law’s	 negative	
space.	345		It	is	a	stretch	to	infer	that	a	congressional	purpose	to	facilitate	
competition	in	the	Hatch-Waman	Act	reveals	congressional	intent	that	
prices	 during	 the	 patent	 term	 must	 remain	 utterly	 unregulated	 by	
states.346		
The	court	argues	that	the	D.C.	Act	conflicts	with	the	Hatch-Waxman	
Act	 because	 of	 the	 “central	 role	 of	 enhanced	 profits	 in	 the	 statutory	
incentive	scheme	it	has	developed.”347	 	As	evidence,	 the	court	cites	to	
legislative	history,	 noting	 the	 importance	of	 supra-competitive	prices	
for	incentivizing	innovation.348		Yet,	this	history	(discussing	the	patent	
term	 extension	 part	 of	 the	 legislation)	 merely	 notes	 that	 patents	
“‘enable	 innovators	 to	 obtain	 greater	 profits	 than	 could	 have	 been	
obtained	if	direct	competition	existed.	 	These	profits	act	as	 incentives	
for	innovative	activities.’”349		Neither	this	cited	Committee	Report	nor	a	
subsequent	 one	 offer	 any	more	 compelling	 evidence	 in	 support	 of	 a	
purpose	to	preempt	state-level	excessive	price	preemption.350		
Furthermore,	 the	 court’s	 position	 both	 ignores	 Congress’s	 less	
deferential	 posture	 towards	 patents	 by	 incentivizing	 competition	
during	 the	 patent	 period	 through	 a	 showing	 of	 noninfringement	 and	
makes	a	logical	flaw.		The	assumption	that	supra-competitive	pricing	is	
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might	 be	 supra-competitive,	 yet	 neither	 excessive	 nor	 unfair.	 	 Above	
market	 pricing,	 absent	 additional	 details,	 is	 not	 in	 itself	 sufficient	 to	
justify	regulation.	
Broader	 consideration	 of	 the	 purposes	 of	 federal	 patent	 law—
beyond	 the	 specifics	 of	 the	 Hatch-Waxman	 Act—also	 yields	 the	
conclusion	that	state	patented	price	regulation	should	not	necessarily	







The	 Federal	 Circuit’s	 ruling	 should	 not	 preempt,	 on	 patent	 law	
grounds,	 state	 level	 excessive	 price	 regulation	 that	 reaches	 patented	
medications.	 	This	 is	so	doctrinally	as	well	as	 from	the	perspective	of	
public	policy.		States	should	not	be	blocked	from	addressing	the	urgent	














	 351	 Aronson	 v.	 Quick	 Point	 Pencil	 Co.,	440	 U.S.	 257,	 262	 (1979);	 see,	 e.g.,	 Burk	 &		
Lemley,	supra	note	64,	at	1576.		Cf.	Lockwood,	supra	note	236,	at	176–77.	
	 352	 States	 might	 further	 consider	 the	 possibility	 of	 shepherding	 a	 new	 excessive	
patented	 drug	 pricing	 statute	 through	 a	 different	 circuit	 court.	 	 Any	 new	 pricing	
regulation	that	meaningfully	reaches	the	prices	of	patented	medications	is	very	likely	to	
face	litigation.		The	procedural	history	of	BIO	v.	D.C.	has	the	interesting	wrinkle	that	D.C.	
originally	 appealed	 the	 case	 to	 the	United	States	Court	 of	Appeals	 for	 the	District	 of	
Columbia	and	then	filed	an	unopposed	motion	to	transfer	the	case	to	the	Federal	Circuit.		
Given	 its	 notoriously	 pro-patent	 stance,	 the	 District’s	 rationale	 for	 this	 transfer	 is	








its	 intended	 public-serving	 purpose.	 	 States,	 unfettered	 by	 patent	
preemption,	 can	 correct	 for	 an	 incredibly	harmful	 instance	of	 federal	
regulatory	failure	that	is	neither	legally	mandated	nor	consistent	with	





is	 the	 avoidance	 of	 price	 regulation	 patent	 preemption	 through	
congressional	 amendment.	 	 States	 could	 lobby	 Congress	 to	





intervention	 stems	 from	 congressional	 inaction	 and	 uncertainty.		
Congress	 has	 not	 itself	 resolved	 the	 problem	 of	 excessively	 priced	
patented	 drugs,	 yet	 here	 it	 is	 being	 suggested	 that	 states	 turn	 to	
Congress.		Several	factors	support	this	strategy.		Such	legislation	gives	
the	 appearance	 of	 federal	 action	 on	 an	 issue	 of	 immense	 political	
importance	without	 Congress	 directly	 needing	 to	 do	 anything:	 it	 can	





Seeking	 congressional	 amendment	 freeing	 states	 to	 address	 the	




jurisdiction	 over	 the	 case	 sua	 sponte.	 	 Biotechnology	 Indus.	 Org.,	 496	 F.3d	 at	 1367.		









Rather	 than	 lobby	Congress,	 craft	 excessive	price	 regulations,	or	
institute	 payment	 initiatives,	 states	 could	 consider	 utilizing	 their	
sovereign	 immunity	 to	 make	 excessively	 priced	 medications	 more	
affordable	both	for	themselves	and	their	constituents.354	 	 If	states	can	
practice	a	patent	without	 liability,	 this	 raises	 the	possibility	 that	 they	
could	 manufacture	 otherwise	 patent-protected	 medications.	 	 Indeed,	
there	has	been	recent	interest	in	government	manufacture	of	generics	
in	California.355		Sovereign	immunity	raises	the	prospect	that	this	policy	
solution	 can	 apply	 more	 broadly	 to	 the	 most	 fiscally	 significant	
medications:	those	that	are	patent	protected.	
U.S.	Supreme	Court	precedent	suggests	this	strategy	is	doctrinally	
viable.	 	 In	 1992,	 Congress	 passed	 a	 sweeping	 amendment	 expressly	
abrogating	 state	 sovereign	 immunity	 for	 claims	 of	 patent	
infringement.356	 	The	Supreme	Court,	however,	 later	 ruled	 that	 states	
cannot	be	stripped	of	their	sovereign	immunity	under	the	Intellectual	
Property	Clause,	and	that	this	particular	attempt	was	an	invalid	exercise	




under	 the	 Fourteenth	Amendment,	 its	 powers	 are	 remedial.359	 	 Valid	
exercise	of	section	5	authority	must	be	congruent	and	proportional.360		
Thus,	 “Congress	 must	 identify	 conduct	 transgressing	 the	 Fourteenth	





stract_id=3846434	 (proposing	 reliance	 on	 state	 sovereign	 immunity	 to	 address		
patented	drug	shortages	during	the	COVID-19	pandemic).	
	 355	 Sophia	Bollag,	New	Law	Paves	Way	for	California	to	Make	Its	Own	Insulin,	Generic	












present	purposes,	 the	Court	made	 clear	 that	what	 is	 at	 issue	 are	due	




our	 precedent,	 a	 State’s	 infringement	 of	 a	 patent,	 though	
interfering	with	a	patent	owner’s	right	to	exclude	others,	does	
not	by	itself	violate	the	Constitution.		Instead,	only	where	the	
State	 provides	 no	 remedy,	 or	 only	 inadequate	 remedies,	 to	
injured	 patent	 owners	 for	 its	 infringement	 of	 their	 patent	
could	a	deprivation	of	property	without	due	process	result.362	
The	 congressional	 amendments	 exposing	 states	 to	 liability	 for	patent	
infringement	in	Florida	Prepaid	Postsecondary	Education	Expense	Board	
v.	 College	 Savings	 Bank	 neither	 addressed	 conduct	 transgressing	 the	
Fourteenth	 Amendment	 nor	 were	 proportional	 to	 the	 perceived	
problem.	 	 As	 Justice	 Kagan	 recently	 recounted,	 these	 patent	
amendments	had	no	limitations:	
Florida	 Prepaid	held,	 the	 Patent	 Remedy	 Act	 swept	 too	 far.		





The	 statute	 did	 not	 distinguish	 between	 negligent	 and	 intentional	
infringement,	 nor	 did	 it	 “target	 States	 refusing	 to	 offer	 alternative	
remedies	to	patent	holders.”364	
State-level	 government	 manufacturing	 of	 patented	 medications	
would	involve	intentional	infringement,	yet	the	key	issue	appears	to	be	
ensuring	 the	 availability	 of	 adequate	 infringement	 remedies.	 	 It	 is	










remedy	 to	 the	 government’s	 unlicensed	 use	 of	 patents	 is	 “reasonable	 and	 entire	
compensation	for	such	use	and	manufacture.”		28	U.S.C.	§	1498.		Section	1498	might	be	
used	 to	 combat	 excessively	 priced	 patented	 medications,	 and	 it	 has	 been	 used	 to	
purchase	cheaper	generic	versions	of	patented	medications.		Brennan	et	al.,	supra	note	




use	 of	 sovereign	 immunity	 to	 address	 problems	 of	 excessive	 drug	







exclusivity	 of	 concern.	 	 States	 would	 also	 need	 to	 grapple	 with	
overcoming	 any	 applicable	 non-patent	 exclusivities.	 	 Second,	 use	 of	
sovereign	immunity	would	saddle	state	governments	not	just	with	the	
task	 of	 crafting	 adequate	 remedies,	 but	 further	 with	 any	 challenges	





could	 have	 the	 comparative	 disadvantage	 of	 introducing	 increased	
instability	and	a	lack	of	predictability	into	pharmaceutical	markets.		In	
short,	 strategic	 use	of	 state	 sovereign	 immunity	 appears	 a	promising	
option,	 but	 any	 such	 policies	 require	 further	 development	 and	
consideration.	
C.		Excessive	Patented	Drug	Price	Regulation	2.0	
In	 reformulating	 comprehensive	 excessive	 patented	 price	
regulation,	 three	 	primary	options	are	 initially	apparent.	 	First,	 states	
could	pursue	price-gouging	laws	of	general	application.		Second,	states	
could	pursue	such	laws	of	limited	reach.		Third,	states	could	craft	laws	
that	 demonstrably	 do	 not	 interfere	 with	 non-excessive	 prices—as	
benchmarked	 to	 the	 goals	 of	 federal	 patent	 law.	 	 A	 fourth	 adjacent	
option	regulates	via	a	tax	penalty.		While	new	state	legislative	proposals	





“in	 no	 way	 general.”367	 	 Further,	 Judge	 Gajarsa,	 in	 his	 subsequent	
concurrence,	wrote	 that	 state	 laws	might	 avoid	 patent	 preemption	 if	




















would	 target	 these	 drugs	 for	 examination	 of	 excessiveness.	 	 If	
broadening	the	scope	of	an	excessive	price	law	is	all	it	takes	to	survive	
patent	 preemption,	 this	 is	 an	 easy	 fix.	 	 This	 change,	 however,	 hardly	
seems	transformative,	so	much	as	cosmetic.		It	is	a	suggestion	to	bury	
the	 lede.	 	While,	 of	 course,	 one	 cannot	 know	with	 certainty,	 it	 seems	




offered	 by	 Judge	 Gajarsa,	 states	 could	 search	 for	 a	 form	 of	 price	
regulation	that	has	an	obvious	and	relatively	uncontroverted	negligible	
impact	 on	 patent-derived	 innovation	 incentives.	 	 Excessive	 price	
regulation	 can	 take	 different	 forms—from	 traditional	 rate	 setting	 to	
price-gouging	laws	targeting	price	increases	during	emergencies.	
Several	 states	have	emergency	price-gouging	 laws	 that	explicitly	
reach	 prescription	 medications.372	 	 The	 emergency	 law	 approach,	

















general	 problem	 of	 excessively	 priced	 patented	 medications	 would	
likely	be	difficult.373	 	 Perhaps	 they	 could	 reach	price	 spikes	 involving	
drug	 shortages	during	 the	 current	pandemic,	but	 it	would	 likely	be	a	
stretch	 for	 them	 to	 accommodate	 drug	 manufacturers’	 routine	 price	
increases,	 and	 they	 are	 vulnerable	 to	 gaming	 through	 launch	 price	
manipulation.	
But	emergency	price-gouging	laws,	for	the	most	part,	seem	to	avoid	
the	 Federal	 Circuit’s	 concerns.	 	 Perhaps	 the	 occasion	 for	 litigation	
simply	has	not	arisen,	but	emergency	price-gouging	laws	have	not	been	
subject	 to	 patent	 preemption	 challenges.	 	 Emergency	 price-gouging	
laws	are	of	general	application,	but	what	 is	notable	 is	that	these	 laws	
apply	 under	 a	 narrow	 set	 of	 circumstances—specified,	 time-limited	
emergencies.	 	 The	 United	 States’	 mismanagement	 prolonging	 the	
domestic	 COVID-19	 pandemic	 notwithstanding,	 these	 laws	 assume	
emergencies	that	are	both	rare	and	relatively	short-lived.		Consequently,	







but	 rather	 a	 premium	procured	 in	 excess	 of	 that	made	possible	 by	 a	
patent	due	to	emergency	conditions.	 	For	these	reasons,	pursuit	of	an	
emergency	 price-gouging	 law,	 while	 possible,	 is	 not	 a	 generally	
compelling	strategy	for	the	problem	at	hand.374		It	is	a	very	limited	and	
likely	ineffectual	mechanism	for	addressing	fundamental	problems	with	





The	 underlying	 determination	 about	 the	 proper	 balance	


















on	something	 like	 the	 following	premise:	determinations	of	excessive	
pricing	have	the	mandatory	prerequisite	of	determining	when	pricing	is	
not	excessive.	 	Determinations	of	non-excessive	pricing,	 in	 turn,	must	
incorporate	considerations	of	sufficient	innovation	incentives.		If	states	
are	 to	 reconcile	 their	 excessive	 price	 regulation	 with	 congressional	
purpose	to	incentivize	innovation,	they	would	need	to	engage	with	the	





This	conclusion	embraces,	 rather	 than	spurns,	 suboptimal	policy	
and	regulatory	failure.		Neither	is	legally	required	nor	desirable.		Having	
considered	 the	 matters	 of	 the	 presumption	 against	 preemption	 and	
congressional	 purpose	 discussed	 above,	 there	 are	 strong	 reasons	 to	
think	that	excessive	patented	pricing	regulations,	including	the	version	
proposed	 by	 the	 D.C.	 Act,	 are	 not	 patent	 preempted.	 	 State-level	
excessive	pricing	regulation	does	not	regulate	the	“incorporeal	right.”		It	
does	 not	 alter	 the	 exclusive	 right	 that	 actually	 comprises	 patent	





upheld	 state	 regulations	 that	 effectively	prohibit	 the	 sale	 of	 patented	














To	 the	 extent,	 however,	 one	 remains	 unconvinced	 by	 this	
argument—the	 nexus	 between	 excessive	 price	 regulation	 and	
congressional	purpose	 to	 incentivize	 is	 thought	 to	be	 just	 too	 close—








sufficient	 incentives	 through	 patent	 rights.	 	 States	 should	 be	 able	 to	
demonstrate	 that	 there	 is	 regulatory	 space	 for	 the	 enactment	 of	
excessive	patented	drug	price	regulation.		This	reconciliation	appears	to	
require	 that	 states,	 in	 some	 form,	 engage	 with	 an	 underlying	
determination	 of	 how	 much	 profit	 is	 sufficient	 to	 achieve	 these	
objectives.	 	 They	 need	 an	 argument	 and	 methodology	 for	 sorting	
between	 instances	 of	 excessive	 and	 non-excessive	 pricing,	 as	
determined	 by	 reference	 to	 federal	 patent	 policy.379	 	 Without	 some	
sense	of	the	amount	of	reward	that	provides	sufficient	incentives,	it	will	
be	 correspondingly	 difficult	 to	 argue	 that	 excessive	 price	 regulation	
does	not	run	afoul	of	federal	patent	law’s	mandate.	
Take,	for	instance,	the	D.C.	Act.		International	reference	pricing	is	a	
metric	 of	 increasing	 popularity	 in	 U.S.	 domestic	 discussions	 of	 drug	
pricing.380		Not	only	do	some	claim	that	it	is	unfair	that	Americans	pay	
 




















more	 for	 the	 same	 drugs	 relative	 to	 our	 high-income	 country	
counterparts,381	but	it	has	also	been	suggested	that	this	overpayment	is	
excessive	 by	 reference	 to	 what	 companies	 need	 to	 recoup	 their	
reasonable	costs	and	make	a	reasonable	profit.382		In	the	case	of	the	D.C.	




this	 threshold.	 	Without	more	 information	and	 justification,	reference	
pricing—that	 is	 basing	 one	 price	 off	 the	 price	 of	 another—bears	 no	




manufacturers.	 	 The	 opposite	 could	 also	 be	 true.	 	 To	 the	 extent	 that	
prices	in	referenced	countries	already	overcompensate	patentees,	a	30	
percent	increase	above	those	prices	would	overcompensate	patentees	
that	much	more.	 	 In	 short,	more	 information	 is	 required	 to	 establish	
definitively	that	the	D.C.	Act’s	presumption	of	excessive	prices	would	be	
unlikely	to	undermine	the	objectives	of	federal	patent	law.	
While	 it	 is	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 Article	 to	 advocate	 for	 a	
particular	methodology,	broadly	speaking,	in	constructing	non-obstacle	
excessive	patented	pricing	legislation,	states	must	grapple	with	at	least	
two	 key	 questions.	 	 First,	 what	 are	 the	 informational	 and	 normative	
requirements	for	determining	that	excessive	price	legislation	does	not	
undermine	patent	incentives?	
A	 determination	 of	 sufficient	 incentives	 will	 involve	 questions	
about	 a	 drug	manufacturer’s	 costs	 as	well	 as	 a	 defensible	metric	 for	
evaluating	a	reasonable	return	on	investment.		Both	are	fraught	topics.		
As	 Michelle	 Mello	 and	 I	 have	 argued	 elsewhere,	 these	 kinds	 of	
calculations	involve	“bumpy	roads.”383		Our	evaluation	of	public	utilities	













Rate-of-return	 regulation	 generally	 suffers	 from	 at	 least	 three	
problems:	 information	 asymmetries;	 time	 and	 resource	 intensive	
processes	 in	 establishing	 formula	 inputs;	 and	perverse	 incentives	 for	
firms	to	be	inefficient	if	returns	are	based	on	costs.386		These	problems	
would	 presumably	 apply	 to	 excessive	 price	 regulation	 of	 patented	
prescription	medications	as	well.	 	Much	of	 the	necessary	 information	
pertaining	 to	 drug	manufacturers’	 costs,	 for	 instance,	 is	 not	 publicly	
available,	and	companies	are	reticent	to	share	such	information.		State	









demonstrate	 that	 an	 excessive	 price	 legislation	 does	 not	 undermine	
patent	 incentives?	 	 The	 less	 this	 exercise	 involves	 a	 process	 like	
traditional	 rate-setting	 and	 resembles	 a	 prescription	 medication	
specific	 excessive	pricing	 law	with	 its	own	standard,	 the	better.	 	 It	 is	
unclear,	however,	what	this	mechanism	might	look	like.		These	practical	
challenges	could	mean	that	state	patented	drug	price	regulation	would	

























Current	 state-level	 unsupported	 or	 excessive	 price	 increase	
proposals	 seek	 to	 address	 this	 concerning	 practice	 through	 a	 tax	 or	
penalty.	 	Drug	manufacturers	remain	 free	to	set	 initial	prices,	but	 if	a	
manufacturer	increases	the	price	of	its	drug	beyond	specified	criteria,	a	
portion	of	that	excessive	increase	will	be	penalized.		Would	such	a	tax	









.	.	.	.”391	 	 The	 power	 of	 states	 over	 patented	 products	 has	 explicitly	
included	 the	 power	 to	 tax	 these	 physical	 embodiments	 of	 intangible	









on	 Excessive	 Price	 Increases	 for	 Prescription	 Drugs	 (Aug.	 14,	 2020),	 https://
www.nashp.org/nashps-proposal-for-imposing-penalties-on-excessive-price-in-

























For	 these	 reasons,	 again	with	 the	 caveat	 that	 limits	 on	 such	 tax	
powers	 require	 further	 investigation	 including	 beyond	 their	
intersection	with	patent	law,	state-level	unsupported	or	excessive	price	
increase	 legislation	 is	 highly	 attractive.	 	 From	 a	 patent	 perspective,	
prima	 facie,	 at	 least	 some	 form	of	 such	 legislation	 appears	 to	 have	 a	
strong	chance	of	legal	survival.		Furthermore,	as	others	have	advocated,	
from	 a	 policy	 perspective,	 unsupported	 or	 excessive	 price	 increase	
legislation	could	be	a	“policy	win-win”:	it	will	either	prevent	excessive	
price	increases	or	generate	new	state	revenue.396		Ensuring	reallocation	
of	 at	 least	 some	of	 that	 revenue	 to	 assist	 patients	with	 out-of-pocket	
costs	will	be	an	important	design	feature.397	


























account	 for	money	 that	 would	 otherwise	 be	 lost	 to	 a	 tax	 penalty	 by	
raising	 initial	 prices	 accordingly.	 	 For	 these	 reasons,	 excessive	 price	







lacks	 the	 doctrinal	 nuances	 that	 attend	 state-level	 excessive	 price	
regulation;	 it	 straightforwardly	 avoids	 issues	 of	 patent	 preemption	
entirely.401	 	 Not	 only	 is	 payment	 regulation	 within	 traditional	 state	
police	powers,	but	neither	the	Hatch-Waxman	Act	nor	the	BPCIA	bear	
on	 state	 payment	 regulation	 for	 the	 purchase	 or	 reimbursement	 of	




charged	 for	 patented	 products.	 	 It	 regulates	 what	 consumers	 and	
purchasers	can	pay	for	medications,	including	those	that	are	patented.	
Unlike	 general,	 or	 comprehensive	 excessive	 price	 regulation,	
payment	 ceilings	 leave	 drug	 manufacturers	 free	 to	 charge	 whatever	
they	 would	 like.	 	 Payment	 regulation	 does	 not	 in	 any	 way	 regulate	
patent	rights	nor	their	potential	patent-derived	rewards.		It	is	true	that	
payment	 regulation	 does	 regulate	 innovation	 incentives.	 	 As	 others	
observe	in	the	context	of	Medicare,	“[h]ealthcare	reimbursements	are	
innovation	 incentives.	 	 Indeed,	 they	 may	 be	 among	 the	 largest	
innovation	 incentives	 in	 the	 pharmaceutical	 sector.”402	 	 But	 the	
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Thus,	 while	 a	 general	 excessive	 price	 regulation	 scheme	 is	
preferable	to	payment	regulation,	as	a	pragmatic	and	workable	second-
second-best	 intervention	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 patent	 preemption,	
payment	 regulation	 is	 presently	 the	 less	 risky	 candidate.	 	 Payment	
regulation	offers	a	workaround	for	states	to	control	costs	and	facilitate	
access	 to	 more	 affordable	 medications.	 	 Further,	 existing	 payment	
regulation	 proposals	 for	 DABs	 have	 sought	 to	 address	 the	 setting	 of	






regulation	 approach.	 	 First,	 there	 are	 challenges	 surrounding	 the	
possibility	of	market	exit.		Though	unlikely	to	be	an	issue	when	there	are	
multiple	therapeutic	alternatives,404	it	could	be	a	problem	particularly	
when	 a	 drug	 is	 the	 only	 one	 in	 its	 class.	 	 The	 strength	 of	 this	worry	
corresponds	with	the	specific	state	setting	payment	rates	and	the	size	of	
its	market.		Drug	manufacturers	may,	for	instance,	be	more	reluctant	to	











A	 second	 potential	 problem	 facing	 payment	 regulation	 in	 the	
particular	 form	 of	 DABs	 is	 its	 administrability.	 	 DABs	 may	 be	 too	
complex	 and	 resource	 intensive	 for	 states,	 particularly	 if	 there	 are	
budget	shortfalls.		On	this	issue,	a	general	excessive	price	regulation	in	
the	 form	 of	 a	 price-gouging	 statute	 could	 be	 an	 easier	 lift—but	 it	










is	 tasked	 with	 enforcement.406	 	 For	 the	 reasons	 discussed	 above,	
however,	excessive	price	regulations	may	or	may	not	be	less	resource	
intensive	for	states.		If	states	need	to	(and	are	permitted	to)	demonstrate	





be	 better	 suited	 to	 a	 state	 agency	 with	 technical,	 domain	 relevant	
expertise,	as	opposed	to	leaving	these	determinations	to	the	judiciary.		









err	 on	 the	 side	 of	 strict	 payment	 limits	 in	 the	 short	 term,	 they	 risk	
discouraging	investment	in	drug	research	and	development	if	the	limits	
were	 widely	 adopted—an	 issue	 of	 obvious	 import	 for	 consumer	
welfare.”408		Thus,	this	concern	is	not	simply	a	variation	on	market	exit,	











legal	 landscape,	 excessive	 price	 increase	 regulation	 implemented	
through	a	tax	retains	some	comparative	practical	advantages	over	DABs.		









particulars,	 the	 administrability	 of	 unsupported	 price	 increase	 laws	
could	 be	 less	 onerous.	 	 Some	 proposals,	 for	 instance,	 incorporate	
reliance	on	determinations	made	independently	and	at	no	cost	to	states	
by	 the	 Institute	 for	 Clinical	 and	 Economic	 Research	 (“ICER”).	 	 ICER	
evaluates	and	identifies	price	increases	that	are	unsupported	by	clinical	
evidence,	and	states	could	rely	on	this	work	to	determine	which	price	
increases	 ought	 to	 be	penalized.409	 	 Other	proposals,	 such	 as	 the	 one	
advanced	 by	 Massachusetts,	 could	 be	 more	 labor	 and	 resource	
intensive.410	 	 Unsupported	 or	 excessive	 price	 increase	 proposals	 also	
would	seem	to	sidestep	any	plausible	concerns	about	disincentivizing	
important	 new	 research.	 	 Since	 tax	 penalties	 are	 imposed	merely	 on	
price	 increases	 benchmarked	 against	 the	 consumer	 price	 index	 or	
determinations	 of	 a	 lack	 of	 supporting	 clinical	 evidence,	 drug	
manufacturers	 still	 have	 great	 leeway	 to	 price	 as	 they	wish	 through	
launch	prices.	
As	 already	 mentioned,	 this	 poses	 a	 significant	 potential	
disadvantage	of	excessive	price	increase	legislation.		Given	its	structure,	
it	 will	 not	 address	 any	 excessiveness	 in	 the	 underlying	 prices	 upon	




For	 these	 reasons,	 to	 the	 extent	more	 comprehensive	 reform	 is	
possible,	despite	its	potential	challenges,	payment	regulation—from	a	
patent	 preemption	 perspective—emerges	 as	 the	 presently	 most	
expedient	policy	tool	of	those	considered	to	comprehensively	address	
the	problem	of	excessively	priced	patented	medications.		It	is	less	risky	
than	 comprehensive	 excessive	 price	 regulation	 given	 existing	 patent	
precedent.	 	 It	 further	appears	 to	be	a	more	 facile	approach	given	 the	
unlikeliness	of	a	targeted	congressional	amendment	in	the	near	future	
and	 the	 nascency	 of	 exploring	 future	 uses	 of	 sovereign	 immunity.	 	 It	
could	 be	 enhanced	 if	 paired	 with	 unsupported	 or	 excessive	 price	




	 409	 Under	 their	discussion	 sub-heading	 “What	Administrative	Feasibility	Concerns	














nor	 good	 policy.	 	 State	 regulation	 of	 excessively	 priced	 patented	
medications	 would	 improve	 physical	 and	 fiscal	 health	 and	 promote	
democratic	preferences	for	reform.		
State	participation	 in	excessive	price	regulation	can	further	have	
desirable	 effects	 on	 calibrating	 and	 refining	 federal	 pharmaceutical	
innovation	 policy.	 	 Patent	 law	 and	 policy	 are	 commonly	 regarded	 as	
dominantly	federal.412		But	the	prospect	of	state	engagement	in	patented	
drug	 price	 and	 payment	 regulation	 reveals	 that	 states	 can	 be	
foregrounded	 as	 active	 participants	 in	 promoting	 and	 shaping	 the	
contours	of	patent	policy.		Through	price	and	payment	regulation,	states	
can	assume	the	role	of	collaborators	and	influencers.	
Unfettered	 by	 patent	 preemption,	 states	 can	 recalibrate	 federal	
patent	 innovation	 policy	 to	 align	 with	 its	 intended	 public-serving	
purpose.		States	can	be	collaborators	in	promoting	the	ends	of	federal	
patent	law.		The	goal	of	states	is	to	protect	the	health	and	welfare	of	their	
citizens	 through	 identifying	 and	 correcting	 for	 egregious	 instances	of	
excessive	pricing.		In	so	doing,	they	promote	the	instrumental	purpose	








Rather	 than	 view	 state	 excessive	 drug	 price	 regulation	 as	 intrusive	
incursions	 on	 federal	 prerogative,	 these	 efforts	 should	 be	 recast	 as	
collaborative.		
State	 regulation	 further	 serves	 as	 a	 vehicle	 for	 manifesting	 the	
overwhelming	 and	 ignored	 bipartisan	 preference	 for	 drug	 pricing	
reform.		Americans	want	drug	price	reform,	but	the	federal	government	









others	 fairly.	 	The	mandate	 for	a	more	efficient	system	is	particularly	
pressing	when	lives,	human	health,	and	the	state	provision	of	social	and	
medical	 services	 are	 needlessly	 curtailed	 to	 overcompensate	 patent	
holders.		Under	present	circumstances,	to	the	extent	that	more	general,	
comprehensive	state	excessive	patented	drug	price	regulation	is	patent	
preempted,	 this	 is	 a	 missed	 opportunity	 and	 contrary	 to	 bipartisan	
democratic	preferences.413	
Finally,	 state	 experimentation	 with	 drug	 price	 regulation	 is	 a	
thriving	laboratory	of	democracy	for	pharmaceutical	innovation	policy	
design.		State	regulation	as	a	means	for	addressing	the	affordability	of	
high-cost	 patented	 medications	 presents	 opportunities	 for	 states	 to	
influence	 both	 innovation	 policy	 and	 associated	 conversations	
regarding	 fair	 drug	 pricing.	 	 With	 respect	 to	 payment	 regulation,	 as	
already	 noted,	 “[h]ealthcare	 reimbursements	 are	 innovation	
incentives.”414		Insurer	coverage	and	payment	rates	function	as	“market-
based	 prizes,	 in	 which	 the	 reward	 incorporates	 both	 a	 government	
assessment	of	social	value	and	market	information	based	on	consumer	
choices.”415		Reimbursement	rates	can	shape	the	allocation	of	incentives	
among	different	kinds	of	 therapies.	 	Admittedly,	 these	effects	may	be	







States	 need	 not	 passively	 accept	 the	 unchecked	 excessive	 pricing	
perpetuated	 by	 lax	 federal	 regulation.	 	 They	 are,	 after	 all,	 direct	
participants	 in	 the	 system	 as	 purchasers	 and	 payers;	 they	 have	
responsibilities	 as	 stewards	 of	 scarce	 resources.	 	 Through	 price	 and	
payment	regulation,	states	have	the	opportunity	 to	advocate	 for	 their	
needs	and	values	and	to	overlay	these	considerations	on	federal	patent	









important,	 but	 they	 are	 not	 the	 only	 thing	 that	 matters.	 	 States	 as	
purchasers	and	payers	of	patented	prescription	medications	also	care	
about	 affordability,	 clinical	 and	 social	 value,	 and	 protecting	 their	
citizens	and	health	systems	from	paying	far	more	than	necessary	for	the	
important	medications	our	nation	needs.		States	have	a	lot	to	contribute	







reference	 to	 the	 aims	 of	 federal	 patent	 law,	 occurs.	 	 Against	 the	
background	 of	 widespread	 unaffordability	 of	 necessary	 medications,	




medications	 is	 preferred.	 	 Despite	 bipartisan	 support	 for	 reform,	







States	 have	 been	 stymied	 in	 these	 efforts	 by	misguided	 existing	




by	 the	 federal	government	unaddressed	 is	undesirable	as	a	matter	of	
public	policy.		To	the	contrary,	states	have	an	important	role	to	play	in	
tackling	the	problem	of	excessively	priced	patented	medications	and	an	
underappreciated	 ability	 to	 recalibrate	 federal	 pharmaceutical	
innovation	policy	towards	its	intended	public-serving	purpose.		Under	
present	 conditions,	 to	 the	 extent	 states	 are	 patent	 preempted	 from	
regulation	 reaching	 excessively	 priced	 patented	 drugs,	 this	 is	 a	
significant	and	unwarranted	missed	opportunity.		
	
